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Vote Denial and Defense: Reaffirming the 
Constitutionality of Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act 
Hayden Johnson† 
Abstract 
Election law advocates and scholars have revered the Voting 
Rights Act (VRA) as holding “super-statute” status. But the Supreme 
Court in Shelby County v. Holder rattled this view after it ruled that 
a core provision of the statute was unconstitutional. Since then, 
jurisdictions nationwide have increasingly enacted so-called “vote 
denial” laws, which restrict where, when, and how voters can 
participate in the electoral process and often disproportionately 
harm voters of color. At the same time, proponents of these restrictive 
laws are making louder and more explicit invitations for the Court 
to also rule unconstitutional the primary remaining VRA tool to 
confront vote denial laws: the Section 2 results test. Indeed, during 
October Term 2020, the Supreme Court will decide Brnovich v. 
Democratic National Committee, a case with significant 
implications for the future of Section 2.  
The arguments that Section 2 is unconstitutional fall into two 
main categories: (1) Section 2 exceeds Congress’ enforcement power 
under the Reconstruction Amendments because the results test lacks 
“congruence and proportionality” to the harm of intentional voting 
discrimination; and (2) Section 2 violates the Equal Protection 
Clause because the results test requires excessive race-consciousness 
by state election decisionmakers. This article discusses both theories 
of Section 2’s purported unconstitutionality and how the Supreme 
Court has handled similar challenges in related antidiscrimination 
contexts. It then rebuts these challenges and reaffirms that the 
prevailing Section 2 results test applied in the vote denial context 
stands on firm constitutional ground.  
 
 †. Legal Fellow, Campaign Legal Center; J.D. 2019, Georgetown University 
Law Center; B.A. 2015, University of Denver. My sincere gratitude to the Law & 
Inequality staff for their valuable edits and to Professor Paul Smith for his insightful 
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Introduction 
After decades of rampant voter suppression, the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act (“VRA” or “the Act”) marked a long-overdue revolution 
for American democracy. A century beforehand at the end of the 
American Civil War, the abolitionist movement saw voting as the 
lynchpin of freedom and Frederick Douglass urged that “[s]lavery is 
not abolished until the black man has the ballot. While the 
Legislatures of the South retain the right to pass laws making any 
discrimination between black and white, slavery still lives there.”1 
Despite backlash from even some progressive lawmakers,2 the 
 
 1. Frederick Douglass, Address at a Business Meeting During the Thirty-
Second Anniversary of the American Anti-Slavery Society (May 10, 1865), in NAT’L 
ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, May 20, 1865 (opposing the dissolution of the Society). 
 2. For example, when a proposed Fourteenth Amendment would have provided 
that “[n]o state, in prescribing the qualifications requisite for electors therein, shall 
discriminate against any person on account of color or race,” Congress resoundingly 
rejected it. Herman V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States During the First Century of Its History, [Proposed Amendments to the 
Constitution, 1789 to 1889] 1896-2 Ann. Rep. Am. Hist. Ass’n 165, 227–28 (1897). As 
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Reconstruction Amendments, in form, assured that the right to vote 
would be provided equally.3 But in function, the Amendments failed 
to make that right a reality for many otherwise eligible minority 
voters.4 
The Fifteenth Amendment facially establishes a forceful 
guarantee of an equal franchise: “The right of citizens of the United 
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”5 But the Supreme Court interpreted this provision 
narrowly, holding soon after its enactment that “[t]he Fifteenth 
Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one” and 
it merely “prevents the States, or the United States, . . . from giving 
preference” to voters based on race.6 
In addition, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment states 
that if the right to vote “is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, . . . the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced” proportionally for the state.7 This appears 
to be a harsh penalty for denials of voting rights,8 but the text still 
envisions a circumscribed political class9 and has been rendered 
 
one Republican senator remarked, “[t]he right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the 
privileges or immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is . . . not regarded as 
one of those fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society . . . .” CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard), 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=072/llcg072.db&recNu
m=847 [https://perma.cc/8WHB-JV6L]. 
 3. See ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION 122–23 (2020).  
 4. See id. at 105–06 (describing shortfalls in the Fifteenth Amendment).  
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 6. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875); see also Guinn v. United 
States, 238 U.S. 347, 362–63 (1915) (“[T]he [Fifteenth] Amendment gives no right of 
suffrage . . . .”). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 8. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 90 (2000) (“In its direct references to suffrage, 
the Fourteenth Amendment was a double-edged sword. Since most congressional 
Republicans—whatever their personal beliefs—were convinced that northern whites 
would not support the outright enfranchisement of [Black voters], the amendment 
took an oblique approach: any state that denied the right to vote to a portion of its 
male citizens would have its representation in Congress (and thus the electoral 
college) reduced in proportion to the percentage of citizens excluded. The clause 
would serve to penalize any southern state that prevented [Black voters] from voting 
without imposing comparable sanctions on similar practices in the North, where 
[Black voters] constituted a tiny percentage of the population.”). 
 9. See id. at 90–91 (“Although this section of the amendment amounted to a 
clear constitutional frown at racial discrimination, . . . [it] tacitly recognized the 
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dormant because it lacks an intelligible way to be enforced in 
court.10 The Fourteenth Amendment also famously guarantees that 
“[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; . . . nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”11 The Supreme Court could have construed these provisions 
to provide an affirmative and equal voting right, but it almost 
immediately refused to do so.12 
Accordingly, the brief surge in minority voters’ political power 
after the Reconstruction Amendments was fleeting, and the equal 
right to vote became merely a parchment promise that gave way to 
local discrimination during the era of Jim Crow.13 Using poll taxes, 
literacy tests, and other “de facto disenfranchisement” devices,14 
many states for decades engaged in an “unremitting and ingenious 
defiance of the Constitution” to deny minority voters their rights.15 
At the same time, rigid segregation exacerbated the problem of 
unequal representation nationwide,16 while rampant intimidation17 
 
right of individual states to erect racial barriers.”). Crucially, the Amendment also 
explicitly permits disenfranchisement “for participation in rebellion, or other crime,” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, which states have used to create sweeping felony 
disenfranchisement programs, and sometimes to effectuate a racially discriminatory 
purpose, Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985). 
 10. See ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE EMBATTLED VOTE IN AMERICA: FROM THE 
FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT 79 (2018) (“Congress never followed through with a 
mechanism for implementing this explosive section of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
it remains unenforced to date. The federal courts have rebuffed efforts to enforce the 
provision judicially, terming enforcement a ‘political question’ outside their 
purview.”); see also, e.g., Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 1945) 
(dismissing a Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2 legal challenge as a nonjusticiable 
political question). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 12. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 171 (1874) (finding the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution “has not added the right of suffrage to the privileges 
and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was adopted”); 
LICHTMAN, supra note 10, at 77 (“[N]arrow court constructions limited [the Equal 
Protection Clause’s] application to suffrage well into the twentieth century.”). 
 13. See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., AN ASSESSMENT OF MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 
ACCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 15–18 (2018), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/ 
2018/Minority_Voting_Access_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6LP-KLCE] [hereinafter 
“USCCR REPORT”] (“Reliance upon tactics to suppress black voting rights expanded 
during the Jim Crow Era . . . and black voter registration subsequently declined 
dramatically.”). 
 14. See LICHTMAN, supra note 10, at 80; KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 16, 109–12. 
 15. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966). 
 16. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN 
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (detailing the 
history of intentional, government-driven housing and zoning segregation). 
 17. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 542–43 (1875) (ruling that the 
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and violence18 targeting minority groups trying to register and vote 
further depressed political participation. Even though this 
environment of disenfranchisement and discrimination was 
repugnant to the explicit agreement struck in the Reconstruction 
Amendments—and generally violative of America’s foundational 
values of equality and government by consent of the governed—the 
Constitution proved impotent to address the challenge of post-
Reconstruction voter suppression.19 
During the Civil Rights Movement, Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. echoed Frederick Douglass’ century-old calls for equal suffrage. 
“The denial of this sacred right [to vote] is a tragic betrayal of the 
 
Fourteenth Amendment did not extend to protections against voter intimidation by 
semi-private entities, like White supremacist organizations); LICHTMAN, supra note 
10, at 92 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court further undercut efforts to protect black voters 
and their allies from white vigilantes . . . . White terrorists could thus intimidate 
black voters without fear of retribution from federal authorities and with the 
knowledge that white supremacist governments supported efforts to suppress the 
black vote by any necessary means.”); ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE 
MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA 18–20 (2015) (detailing private 
intimidation efforts). 
 18. See, e.g., KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 91 (detailing that in New Orleans in 1866, 
for example, “one of the most flagrant incidents of violence” occurred when advocates 
attempted to hold a constitutional convention favoring Black suffrage and thirty-four 
Black and four White attendees were killed, with dozens of others wounded). 
 19. Notwithstanding the explicit language in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments promoting free and equal access to the ballot box, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the Constitution in a manner that tolerated certain discriminatory 
practices for many decades. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 171 (1874); 
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 
213, 225 (1898) (holding unanimously that Mississippi’s literacy and poll-tax 
qualifications were constitutional because they “[did] not on their face discriminate 
between the races, and it has not been shown that their actual administration was 
evil, only that evil was possible under them”); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486–88 
(1903) (Holmes, J.) (rejecting a challenge to Alabama’s discriminatory voting and 
registration system for an apparent lack of available equitable relief, stating that 
“equity cannot undertake now, any more than it has in the past, to enforce political 
rights” of access to the ballot box); Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 160 (1904) 
(rejecting plaintiffs’ revised claims at law under the political question doctrine); 
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 250 (1921) (upholding White primaries 
because primary elections “are in no sense elections for an office, but merely methods 
by which party adherents agree upon candidates whom they intend to offer and 
support . . . .”); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (“To make payment of 
poll taxes a prerequisite of voting is not to deny any privilege or immunity protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Privilege of voting is not derived from the United 
States, but is conferred by the State . . . .”); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 48 
(1935) (approving White primaries under the state action doctrine); Lassiter v. 
Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 54 (1959) (upholding North 
Carolina’s basic literacy test in the absence of a showing of discriminatory 
application). 
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highest mandates of our democratic tradition,” Dr. King said.20 
“Give us the ballot, and we will no longer have to worry the federal 
government about our basic rights.”21 Congress answered this call 
on the heels of violent clashes in the Jim Crow South and enacted 
the VRA in 1965.22 Many exalted the VRA as “the dawn of 
freedom”23 because, unlike the Reconstruction Amendments, the 
VRA offered a toolbox of incisive, prophylactic enforcement 
measures to extinguish disenfranchisement wherever racial 
animus could fester. As the Supreme Court recognized: 
 
After enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the 
Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might well decide to shift the 
advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil 
to its victims . . . . [It] has marshalled an array of potent 
weapons against the evil, with authority in the Attorney 
General to employ them effectively . . . . [M]illions of non-white 
Americans will now be able to participate for the first time on 
an equal basis.24 
 
But the history of enfranchisement is one of expansions and 
contractions,25 and advancing the gains of the VRA requires 
proactive efforts in the face of renewed challenges to the Act’s 
constitutionality.26 In 2013, the Supreme Court in Shelby County v. 
Holder ruled unconstitutional the coverage formula used to enforce 
Section 5 of the VRA,27 effectively nullifying the core mechanism for 
the federal government to prevent discriminatory voting laws from 
 
 20. Martin Luther King, Jr., Give Us the Ballot: Address Delivered at the Prayer 
Pilgrimage for Freedom (May 17, 1957), in THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, 
JR., VOLUME IV: SYMBOL OF THE MOVEMENT, JANUARY 1957–DECEMBER 1958 
(Clayborne Carson et al. eds.), at 208, 210, https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-
papers/documents/give-us-ballot-address-delivered-prayer-pilgrimage-freedom 
[https://perma.cc/V275-ANXX]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. BERMAN, supra note 17, at 13, 18, 35–36. 
 23. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR 
COMMUNITY? 35 (1967). 
 24. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328, 337 (1966); see also Allen 
v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548 (1969) (“[T]he Act implemented Congress’ 
firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting.”). 
 25. See generally KEYSSAR, supra note 8 (describing the turbulent history of 
voting rights). 
 26. USCCR REPORT, supra note 13, at 277 (“The right to vote is the bedrock of 
American democracy. It is, however, a right that has proven fragile and in need of 
both Constitutional and robust statutory protections . . . . Voter access issues, 
discrimination, and barriers to equal access for voters with disabilities and for voters 
with limited-English proficiency continue today.”). 
 27. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified 
at 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a)). 
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going into effect.28 After that litigation success for opponents of the 
VRA, now Section 2 of the Act has become the new focus. Section 2, 
like Section 5, prohibits voting discrimination by purpose or in effect 
and employs a “results test” to cut back election laws that 
disproportionately burden minority voters compared to White 
voters under conditions of race discrimination.29  
In the wake of Shelby County, and by recycling many of the 
arguments made during that litigation and in other voting cases, 
proponents of restrictive voting laws are now emboldened to contest 
the constitutionality of the Section 2 results test. Indeed, during 
October Term 2020 the Supreme Court will decide Brnovich v. DNC, 
the Court’s first Section 2 case in a non-redistricting context and 
one that carries significant implications for the future of the VRA.30 
Brnovich v. DNC involves two consolidated appeals from an en banc 
Ninth Circuit opinion that held Arizona’s prohibition of out-of-
precinct voting and some third-party ballot collection violated 
Section 2’s results test.31 Petitioners seeking to maintain Arizona’s 
restrictions (along with numerous supporting amici) have 
strenuously argued that the manner by which the Ninth Circuit 
applied Section 2 has substantial constitutional defects, and the 
Court should promulgate a much more onerous standard to avoid 
these alleged concerns.32 Thus, the question of Section 2’s 
constitutional status is squarely before the Supreme Court, and the 
 
 28. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 549–53 (2013) (holding 
unconstitutional the Section 4(b) coverage formula enforcing Section 5 of the VRA 
for violating the “‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the states”); see 
also BERMAN, supra note 17, at 280 (“Roberts’s opinion turned Section 5 into a 
zombie, a body with no life in it.”). 
 29. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) 
(confirming the appropriate interpretation of the revised Section 2 and its “results 
test”). 
 30. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (2020) (mem.); Ariz. 
Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 (2020) (mem.). 
 31. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2020) (en 
banc). The court further held that Arizona enacted the third-party ballot collection 
law with discriminatory intent, in violation of Section 2’s intent test and the 
Fifteenth Amendment. Id. 
 32. See Brief for State Petitioners at 24–33, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 
Nos. 19-1257 & 19-1258 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2020), 2020 WL 7121776 (making scope of 
enforcement, Equal Protection Clause, and Elections Clause arguments against 
Section 2); Brief for Private Petitioners at 39–42, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., Nos. 19-1257 & 19-1258 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2020), 2020 WL 7121775 (making 
scope of enforcement and Equal Protection Clause arguments against Section 2). For 
amici making additional constitutional arguments, see Docket, Brnovich v. 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 19-1257 (U.S.) (amici filings from December 3 to 
December 7, 2020). 
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outlook remains uncertain.33 If the Supreme Court chooses to 
eliminate or curtail Section 2’s results test, the potential 
consequence could be an unchecked rise in discriminatory practices 
in voting to a degree not seen since the Jim Crow era.34  
This article confronts the most prominent constitutional 
challenges to the prevailing Section 2 results test. Part I discusses 
how practices that deny or abridge minority voters’ equal access to 
the political process—so-called “vote denial”35 laws—have increased 
nationwide in recent years,36 and overviews the two-part results 
test that federal courts have developed to apply Section 2 in this 
context. Part II details the two primary constitutional claims 
against the vote denial results test, and rebuts both of those 
theories. Namely, proponents of vote denial laws argue that the 
Section 2 results test is unconstitutional because it (1) exceeds 
Congress’ enforcement power by proscribing conduct that is too 
remote from the constitutional injury of intentional voting 
 
 33. See Matt Naham, SCOTUS Agrees to Decide Major New Case that Lawyers 
Fear Will Dramatically ‘Weaken’ Landmark Civil Rights Law, LAW & CRIME (Oct. 2, 
2020), www.lawandcrime.com/supreme-court/scotus-agrees-to-decide-major-new-
case-that-lawyers-fear-will-dramatically-weaken-landmark-civil-rights-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y3EU-ZVWY] (describing voting rights advocates’ concerns about 
the implications for the VRA); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, 
The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 
1391 (2015) (“Shelby County marks the death of the VRA as a superstatute.”).  
 34. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Unified Law, 128 YALE 
L.J. 1566, 1577–78 (2019) (“Since 2010 . . . twenty-three states have implemented 
new franchise restrictions. Thirteen have required identification for voting; eleven 
have limited voter registration; seven have reduced the timespan available for early 
voting; and three have delayed the restoration of voting rights for people with 
criminal convictions. These measures amount to the most systematic retrenchment 
of the right to vote since the [C]ivil [R]ights [E]ra. In geographic coverage, indeed, 
they surpass the franchise restrictions of Jim Crow . . . .” (emphasis in original)). 
 35. Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the 
Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 691–92 (2006) (applying the “VRA to practices 
such as felon[y] disenfranchisement, voting machines, and voter ID laws represents 
a new generation . . . . This article collectively refers to these practices as the ‘new 
vote denial.’”). 
 36. See, e.g., Danielle Lang & J. Gerald Hebert, A Post-Shelby Strategy: Exposing 
Discriminatory Intent in Voting Rights Litigation, 127 YALE L.J.F. 779, 784 (2018) 
(“This disconcerting trend [to enact voting restrictions] coincided with the loss of 
preclearance in Shelby County. These events have resulted in an avalanche of voting 
restrictions that target minority voters to minimize their political power.”); Pamela 
S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial 
Claims, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 766 (2016) (quoting SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. 
KARLAN, RICHARD H. PILDES & NATHANIEL PERSILY, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: 
LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 124 (5th ed. 2016)) (observing that the 
elimination of Section 5 coverage and “understandings about the ‘empirical relation 
between turnout and election outcomes[]’ produced a spate of measures in which 
Republican officials cut back on expansions to voting opportunities previously 
implemented by Democrats”). 
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discrimination; and (2) violates the Equal Protection Clause by 
requiring excessive consideration of race at the expense of other 
interests in electoral decision-making. The article concludes, 
however, that these arguments are unfounded because they 
overlook key aspects of Congress’ enforcement power in protecting 
voting rights, misconstrue the difficulties of succeeding on a results 
test claim, and conflate the nature of the interests at stake and 
remedies sought with other dissimilar antidiscrimination contexts. 
When the Supreme Court decides Brnovich v. DNC or any other 
subsequent Section 2 results test cases, it should reaffirm the 
constitutionality of the statute and retain the prevailing results test 
applied in the vote denial context. 
I. Modern Voter Suppression and the Section 2 Results 
Test 
Since Shelby County v. Holder, voting has become more 
burdensome in many states across the country.37 Civil rights 
reports have detailed the rising use of electoral laws or practices 
that discriminate against minority voters, including the increased 
enactment of voter photo-ID laws, stricter registration 
requirements and removal programs, and cutbacks to prior 
expansions on where, when, and how eligible voters may cast a 
ballot.38 Texas, for example, has repeatedly faced lawsuits for its 
persistent use of discriminatory redistricting maps and strict voter 
qualification laws.39 Georgia’s Governor and former Secretary of 
 
 37. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 34, at 1578 n.41. 
 38. See, e.g., USCCR REPORT, supra note 13, at 60; THE LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE EDUCATION FUND, DEMOCRACY DIVERTED: POLLING PLACE CLOSURES 
AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 12–18 (2019), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/ 
Democracy-Diverted.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBM8-BXMX]; NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE 
AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEMOCRACY DIMINISHED: STATE AND LOCAL THREATS TO 
VOTING POST-SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA V. HOLDER 34 (2018), https://www.naacp 
ldf.org/wp-content/uploads/Democracy-Diminished-State-and-Local_Threats-to-
Voting_Post-Shelby-County,Alabama-v.Holder__Political_Participation__.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y3VX-9MV7]; BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., PURGES: A GROWING 
THREAT TO THE RIGHT TO VOTE 3 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Purges_Growing_Threat.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B8YT-M2PF] (examining registration data across 6,600 
jurisdictions, finding that the median rate of purging across the country has 
increased significantly, rising from 6.2 percent of voters to 7.8 percent since 2008); 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., NEW VOTING RESTRICTIONS IN AMERICA 1 (2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/New%20Voting 
%20Restrictions.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XXB-KNL4] (showing rise in strict photo ID 
requirements, early voting cutbacks, and registration restrictions since 2010). 
 39. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 178 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(ruling on the discriminatory result claim, but also noting that “record evidence may 
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State, Brian Kemp, also has a long history of voter suppression 
accusations.40 While overseeing elections during his own 
gubernatorial campaign in 2018, Kemp is alleged to have closed or 
moved polling places in districts where minority voters live, purged 
nearly 670,000 voters from the registration rolls (almost 70 percent 
of whom were minority voters), and stifled the counting of 
provisional and absentee ballots that would have benefitted his 
opponent, Stacey Abrams, a prominent voting rights advocate.41 
North Carolina presents even more stark examples of voting 
discrimination. The Fourth Circuit struck down a 2014 omnibus 
election law for targeting minority voters with “surgical precision”42 
and the state legislature has battled in the courts for decades to 
retain redistricting maps that dilute minority voters’ electoral 
strength,43 among other discriminatory efforts.44  
 
support a finding of discriminatory purpose in enacting the State House Plan. 
Although we need not reach this issue, at minimum, the full record strongly suggests 
that the retrogressive effect we have found may not have been accidental”); Veasey 
v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 265, 272 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (invalidating a voter-ID 
law for discriminatory effect, but remanding for the lower court to reevaluate the 
plaintiff’s intent claim); Texas League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Whitley, No. 
CV SA-19-CA-074-FB, 2019 WL 7938511, at *1–2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2019) (finding 
that a Texas registration purge program was “a solution looking for a problem” and 
used a process that was “inherently paved with flawed results,” “ham-handed,” and 
“exemplifies the power of government to strike fear and anxiety and to intimidate 
the least powerful among us”); see also Yael Bromberg, Youth Voting Rights and the 
Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1105, 
1149 (2019) (discussing a lawsuit involving disenfranchisement on an historically 
Black public university campus in rural Texas). 
 40. See, e.g., Carol Anderson, Opinion, Brian Kemp, Enemy of Democracy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 11, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2Ou8LA5 [https://perma.cc/3YKT-9DBJ] 
(discussing Brian Kemp’s history with voter suppression); Spencer Woodman, 
Register Minority Voters in Georgia, Go to Jail, NEW REPUBLIC (May 5, 2015), 
newrepublic.com/article/ 
121715/georgia-secretary-state-hammers-minority-voter-registration-efforts 
[https://perma.cc/RU4B-HPDB] (detailing Brian Kemp’s efforts as Secretary of State 
to restrict voting access by the threat of fraud prosecutions). 
 41. See Fair Fight Action, Inc. v. Raffensperger, 413 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1292 (N.D. 
Ga. 2019) (denying a motion to dismiss a VRA Section 2 claim pertaining to 
discrimination in Georgia’s voting and registration system); Ga. Coal. for the People’s 
Agenda, Inc. v. Kemp, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1264–69 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (granting a 
preliminary injunction against a Georgia voter registration purge); Richard Fausset, 
‘Large-Scale Reforms’ of Georgia Elections Sought in Federal Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 26, 2018), nyti.ms/2zsQpug [https://perma.cc/8638-MQ6T] (detailing Kemp’s 
involvement in voter suppression in Georgia and a related lawsuit). 
 42. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 43. Carli Brosseau, A Short History of the Court Battles over NC Congressional 
Districts, NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 29, 2018, 2:57 PM), www.newsobserver.com/ 
news/politics-government/state-politics/article217504240.html [https://perma.cc/ 
KHL4-4J83]. 
 44. See Blake Paterson, Bipartisan Furor as North Carolina Election Law 
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Minority voters also overcame extraordinary hurdles and 
suppression efforts to exercise their rights during the 2020 election 
cycle, ranging from excessive purges of voter registration lists, to 
polling place closures and overburdening, to widespread 
intimidation efforts.45 In one particularly egregious case in North 
Carolina’s Alamance County, police confronted Black voters 
marching to the polls by indiscriminately firing tear gas at the 
marchers, evoking scenes reminiscent of the Civil Rights 
Movement.46  
These examples are abundant, increasing, and not confined to 
the South.47 States ranging from New York to North Dakota to 
Arkansas have administered new or existing laws that make it 
harder to vote, and often disproportionately so for minority 
groups.48 And almost all of these restrictive laws are justified by a 
 
Shrinks Early Voting Locations by Almost 20 Percent, PROPUBLICA: ELECTIONLAND 
(Sept. 24, 2018, 5:00 AM), www.propublica.org/article/bipartisan-furor-as-north-
carolina-election-law-shrinks-early-voting-locations-by-almost-20-percent 
[https://perma.cc/J8Z5-KL8Y] (“In June [2018], the North Carolina General 
Assembly passed legislation mandating that all early voting sites in the state remain 
open for uniform hours on weekdays from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. . . . [but] county election 
officials from both parties have expressed near uniform discontent over the new 
requirements . . . .”); Colin Campbell, NC Republican Party Seeks ‘Party Line 
Changes’ to Limit Early Voting, NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 17, 2016), 
www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/election/article96179857.html 
[https://perma.cc/WXQ5-CP64] (detailing coordinated GOP election officials’ efforts 
to reduce voting opportunities used primarily by minority voters). 
 45. See, e.g., Sherrilyn Ifill, No, This Election Did Not Go “Smoothly”, SLATE 
(Nov, 9, 2020), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/11/2020-election-voting-did-
not-go-smoothly.html [https://perma.cc/8WH3-NVBK] (describing voter intimidation 
and long voting lines, among other concerns); Shondiin Silversmith, Native Voters 
Still Find Obstacles on Election Day, but Advocates Work to Remove Barriers, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC (Oct. 31, 2020), www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/ 
2020/10/31/advocates-work-break-down-barriers-native-voters/5980832002/ 
[https://perma.cc/RBE4-4RBR] (discussing the closure of polling locations); Eileen 
Sullivan, A Lawsuit in Georgia Claims that Nearly 200,000 Registered Voters Were 
Improperly Purged, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020), https://nyti.ms/39BKmGE 
[https://perma.cc/QV4D-GUGF] (describing efforts to restore registration status to 
voters who were purged from registration lists).  
 46. See Complaint, Allen v. City of Graham, No. 1:20-cv-00997 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 2, 
2020); see also Zachery Eanes & Carli Brosseau, March to Alamance Polls Ends with 
Police Using Pepper-Spray on Protesters, Children, NEWS & OBSERVER (Nov. 3, 2020), 
www.charlotteobserver.com/news/state/north-carolina/article246861942.html 
[https://perma.cc/F8WQ-5F5J] (describing events in Alamance County).  
 47. See, e.g., Voting Laws Roundup 2020, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 4, 
2020), www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-
2020 [https://perma.cc/M2KF-7Y8Y]; Ally J. Levine & Blake Paterson, How Voting 
Laws Have Changed Since 2016, PROPUBLICA (June 25, 2018), 
projects.propublica.org/graphics/voting-changes-2018 [https://perma.cc/9TLD-F9K5] 
(cataloguing voting laws by state). 
 48. See, e.g., USCCR REPORT, supra note 13, at 82 (“At least 23 states have 
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fear of widespread voting fraud—a concern not supported in 
empirical reality and often used as a crude cover for efforts to shave 
off votes for the opposing political party.49 
Congress enacted Section 2 of the VRA to strike down precisely 
these types of restrictions that import conditions of race 
discrimination into the political process and disproportionately 
burden minority voters.50 As amended in 1982, Section 2 proscribes 
any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice or procedure . . . which results in a denial or abridgement 
of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or color [or 
membership in a language-minority group].”51 The Senate Report 
 
enacted newly restrictive statewide voter laws since the Shelby County decision.”); 
James MacPherson, North Dakota, Tribes Fail to Reach Settlement over Voter ID 
Lawsuit, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 30, 2018), www.apnews.com/ 
bd727123ddc542a1aafedc574b1eee03 [https://perma.cc/C4H6-9S3P]; Max Brantley, 
Arkansas Voter ID Law an Impediment to Voting, Lawsuit Argues, ARK. TIMES (Mar. 
19, 2018, 2:29 PM) www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2018/03/19/arkansas-
voter-id-law-an-impediment-to-voting-lawsuit-argues [https://perma.cc/36XK-689P]; 
Sam Levine, New York is One of the Bluest States in the Country. Its Voting Laws 
Are Horrendous., HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2018), www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
entry/new-york-votinglaws_us_5b97ffb9e4b0162f4731895a [https://perma.cc/C27N-
UZM9]; Sari Horowitz, Want to Vote in This State? You Have to Have a Passport or 
Dig Up a Birth Certificate, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2016), www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/19/how-kansas-has-become-a-battleground-state-for-
voting-rights/ [https://perma.cc/S8CL-2UQN]. 
 49. As one prominent election law scholar has summarized, “[t]he issue of 
organized voter fraud has now been put to the test in courts and in social science” 
and amounts to no more than “a sham perpetuated by people who should know 
better, advanced for political advantage.” RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION MELTDOWN 
128 (2020). For more detailed descriptions of studies debunking the myth of large-
scale voter fraud, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO 
THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 41–75 (2012); LICHTMAN, supra note 10, at 189–93; 
USCCR REPORT, supra note 13, at 102–21. For a discussion of how allegations of 
voter fraud have become the “new Southern strategy,” see LORRAINE C. MINNITE, 
THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD 89–90 (2010). 
 50. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986). 
 51. Section 2 states in full:  
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision 
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in 
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, 
as provided in subsection (b). 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination 
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to 
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in 
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives 
of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been 
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accompanying the 1982 amendment broadly characterized Section 
2 as “the major statutory prohibition of all voting rights 
discrimination” that “prohibits practices, which . . . result in the 
denial of equal access to any phase of the electoral process . . . .”52 
In essence, Section 2 is designed to bar any laws that, by purpose or 
as a result, make it disproportionately harder for minority voters to 
participate in elections as compared to White voters because of 
conditions of discrimination.53 
In the past, Section 2 advocates have most often sought relief 
under the results test in what is called the “vote dilution” context, 
which concerns how a jurisdiction’s districting practices may dilute 
minority voting strength.54 Section 2 applied to vote dilution follows 
a well-established four-part totality analysis called the “Gingles 
framework.”55 Because the nature of the harm to voters in vote 
dilution cases is distinct from the harm imposed by vote denial laws, 
the nature of the analysis and relevant considerations must also be 
different.56 Accordingly, the rise of vote denial laws in the last 
 
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance 
which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes 
a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to 
their proportion in the population. 
52 U.S.C. § 10301. 
 52. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30 (1982); see also Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 
347 (E.D. La. 1983) (upholding Section 2’s constitutionality and detailing the 
legislative discussion surrounding its scope during the 1982 amendments). 
 53. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (“[A] violation of § 2 could be 
established by proof of discriminatory results alone.”). Congress deliberately omitted 
any requirement of showing intent, having “revised the statute ‘to make clear that a 
violation [can] be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone.’” Veasey v. Abbott, 
830 F.3d 216, 277 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Higginson, J., concurring) (citing 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986)). 
 54. See Tokaji, supra note 35, at 703–09; see also Lani Guinier, The Triumph of 
Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 1077, 1093–94 (1991) (detailing that as jurisdictions became more elusive in 
their efforts to limit minority voting, states created “second generation” barriers that 
dilute minority electoral power through districting or at-large election processes). 
 55. The framework comes from Thornburg v. Gingles, the paradigmatic vote 
dilution case in which the Supreme Court applied Section 2 to North Carolina’s state 
legislative redistricting plan. 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986). In an opinion by Justice 
Brennan, the Court established a tripartite threshold test for Section 2 vote dilution 
claims. Minority plaintiffs alleging a violation must establish that they are: (1) 
sufficiently large and geographically compact; (2) politically cohesive; and 
(3) often denied an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice because of 
racial polarization. Id. at 50–51. After proving the “preconditions” for vote dilution 
claims, the court then moves onto a fourth step and considers the totality of 
circumstances using the nine Senate Factors. Id. at 36–37, 49–50. 
 56. See Tokaji, supra note 35, at 718–23. 
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decade and the initial lack of a uniform Section 2 results test in that 
distinct context led to some brief confusion.57  
In recent years, however, the circuit courts have mostly 
coalesced around the same two-part analysis: a vote denial law or 
practice violates Section 2 if it (1) causes a disparate impact on 
minority voters (2) through the law’s interaction with conditions of 
social or historical race discrimination.58 Vote denial plaintiffs must 
show more than a bare statistical disparity between the burden on 
minority and nonminority voting groups59 by also proving some of 
the non-exhaustive, circumstantial factors listed in the 1982 Senate 
Report.60 These factors indicate when disparities are likely to be an 
outgrowth of discrimination and lack a legitimate justification.61 
 
 57. See id. at 720; Derek T. Muller, The Democracy Ratchet, 94 IND. L.J. 451, 
468–69 (2019). 
 58. Stephanopoulos, supra note 34, at 1574–75. Multiple circuit courts have 
applied the same two-part results test in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Democratic 
Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1012 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (in the context of 
out-of-precinct voting and third-party ballot collection restrictions); Veasey v. 
Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 277 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (in the context of a voter photo 
ID law); Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 626–27 (6th Cir. 
2016) (relating to absentee and provisional ballot process); League of Women Voters 
of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir. 2014) (addressing challenges 
to numerous laws, including restrictions on same-day registration and out-of-
precinct voting); Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554 (6th 
Cir. 2014), vacated as moot, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014) 
(addressing early voting cutbacks). 
 59. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(“Despite its broad language, Section 2 does not prohibit all voting restrictions that 
may have a racially disproportionate effect.”); Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. 
Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a Section 2 
claim using statistical evidence regarding land ownership because “a bare statistical 
showing of disproportionate impact on a racial minority does not satisfy the § 2 
‘results’ inquiry” (emphasis in original)); Ortiz v. City of Phila. Off. of the City 
Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 314–15 (3d Cir. 1994) (rejecting a 
results claim against a voter purge law that had a disparate statistical impact, but 
did not sufficiently demonstrate a causal nexus and presence of the Senate Factors). 
 60. The Senate Factors are: (1) the history of voting-related discrimination in the 
State or political subdivision; (2) the extent of racially polarized voting in the 
elections of the State or political subdivision; (3) the extent to which the State or 
political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance 
the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; (4) the exclusion of 
members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; (5) the extent to 
which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such 
as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate 
effectively in the political process; (6) the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in 
political campaigns; (7) the extent to which minority group members have been 
elected to public office; (8) whether elected officials are unresponsive to the 
particularized needs of the members of the minority group; and (9) whether the 
policy underlying the State’s or the political subdivision’s use of the contested 
practice or structure is tenuous. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29. 
 61. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 624–27 (1982) (analyzing similar factors 
in an intentional voting discrimination case). 
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Although some election law scholars have criticized aspects of 
the two-part framework,62 others have indicated that the analysis 
strikes the balance of being flexible and probing to target even well-
disguised voter suppression, while not interfering in every aspect of 
election management.63 As Congress observed in 2006, 
“[d]iscrimination today is more subtle than the visible methods used 
in 1965,” but efforts to deny the “minority community’s ability to 
fully participate in the electoral process and to elect their preferred 
candidates” continue to suppress eligible voters.64 The two-part vote 
denial results test is an effective and appropriate tool for 
challenging these subtler methods of disenfranchisement. The first 
prong indicates that a voting restriction may cause undue harm to 
minority voters, and the second prong weighs the totality of the 
circumstances to reveal whether that harm is precipitated by or 
further perpetuates conditions of discrimination.65 In other words, 
the Section 2 vote denial results test is an effective device to 
diminish inequality in voting while stopping short of preventing 
 
 62. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased 
Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 377, 384 (2012) (suggesting plaintiffs should have to prove “to a significant 
likelihood that the electoral inequality is traceable to race-biased decisionmaking” 
(emphasis in original)); Jamelia N. Morgan, Disparate Impact and Voting Rights: 
How Objections to Impact-Based Claims Prevent Plaintiffs from Prevailing in Cases 
Challenging New Forms of Disenfranchisement, 9 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 93, 158–
60 (2018) (advancing a burden-shifting approach); Michael J. Pitts, Rethinking 
Section 2 Vote Denial, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2018) (arguing for a balancing 
test for Section 2); Stephanopoulos, supra note 34, at 1620–21 (arguing for a 
“unification” of disparate impact law and grafting developed rules from Title VII and 
Fair Housing Act cases onto the Section 2 vote denial test); Daniel P. 
Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 
474, 477 (2015) (drawing from employment discrimination under Title VII and juror 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause to suggest a burden-shifting 
framework in Section 2); see also Lang & Hebert, supra note 36, at 782 (advocating 
for an intent-based strategy to enforcing Section 2). 
 63. See Dale E. Ho, Building an Umbrella in a Rainstorm: The New Vote Denial 
Litigation Since Shelby County, 127 YALE L.J.F. 799, 820 (2018) (claiming that 
disparate impact is a necessary component of Section 2 liability, but not sufficient to 
state a claim on its own and the Senate Factors inquiry sufficiently narrows 
liability); Dale E. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County: Mechanics and 
Standards in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 675, 
701 (2014) (making a similar argument); Karlan, supra note 36, at 767–68 
(supporting the two-part test, but warning that turnout reduction should not be a 
required evidentiary showing); Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate 
Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 597–98 (2013) (adding that courts should focus on 
“examin[ing] the historical racial context of discrimination” when analyzing a vote 
denial burden and scrutinize proof of implicit bias in the totality examination). 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 6 (2006). 
 65. See generally Stephanopoulos, supra note 34, at 1578–79 (describing the 
origin and current application of the two-part test). 
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jurisdictions from managing their own elections in a non-
discriminatory manner. 
Proponents of vote denial measures, the myth of widespread 
voter fraud, and increased deference to local management of the 
political process have disagreed that Section 2 achieves this 
balance. Conservative election law commentators have increasingly 
challenged the constitutional status of the two-part vote denial test 
in legal articles and blogs.66 Voting jurisdictions, lawmakers, and 
special interest groups serving as amici have explicitly argued in 
litigation that aspects of Section 2 are unconstitutional.67 And even 
 
 66. See, e.g., J. Christian Adams, Transformation: Turning Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act into Something It Is Not, 31 TOURO L. REV. 297, 319–21 (2015); 
Roger Clegg, The Future of the Voting Rights Act After Bartlett and 
NAMUDNO, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35, 49–50 (2009); Roger Clegg & Hans A. von 
Spakovsky, “Disparate Impact” and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, HERITAGE 
FOUND.: LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 119, at 1, 4 (Mar. 17, 2014), http://thf_ 
media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/LM119.pdf [https://perma.cc/W98J-SHBV]; Noel 
H. Johnson, Resurrecting Retrogression: Will Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
Revive Preclearance Nationwide?, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (2017); 
Chris Kieser, Federal Courts Expanding Disparate Impact Analysis in Recent Voting 
Rights Act Cases, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://pacificlegal.org/ 
federal-courts-expanding-disparate-impact-analysis-recent-voting-rights-act-cases/ 
[https://perma.cc/3UL2-YPGB]. 
 67. The Petitioners in Brnovich v. DNC raise constitutional avoidance 
arguments to support their preferred standard, and numerous amici argue more 
explicitly that Section 2 is unconstitutional. See supra note 32. But these arguments 
are not unique to this case. For briefs raising arguments that Section 2 is 
unconstitutional because it is not a proper enforcement statute of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28, Abbott v. Veasey, 137 S. Ct. 
612 (2017) (No. 16-393), 2016 WL 5390670; Brief for Appellees at 32, Bethune-Hill 
v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017) (No. 15-680), 2016 WL 6123732; 
Appellant Brief at 28–33, Alabama v. Ala. State Conf. of the NAACP, No. 17-14443 
(11th Cir. Nov. 13, 2017), 2017 WL 5495567; Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal 
Found., Ctr. for Equal Opportunity, and Project 21 in Support of Defendants-
Appellees at 3–4, N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 
2016) (No. 16-1468), 2016 WL 3438051; Amended Amicus Brief in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 28, N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP 
v. Cooper, No. 1:18-cv-01034-LCB-LPA (M.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 2019), 2019 WL 7882013; 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 
18–19, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Abbott, No. 5:18-cv-00175 (W.D. Tex. 
Apr. 9, 2018), 2018 WL 8262596; Defendants’ Brief in Support of Their Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 24–25, One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Nichol, No. 15-CV-324 (W.D. 
Wis. Jan. 11, 2016), 2016 WL 8738854; Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs ’ 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 26 n.11, Thompson v. Hood, No. 3:15-cv-
620-CWR-FKB (S.D. Miss. Sept. 3, 2015), 2015 WL 10521829. For briefs raising 
constitutional concerns based on the Equal Protection Clause, see Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari at 29, Veasey, 137 S. Ct. 612 (No. 16-393); Brief for Appellants at 48–
49, Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) (No. 15-1262), 2016 WL 4771954; Brief 
for Appellees at 33–34, Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. 788 (No. 15-680); Brief of Senator 
Thom Tillis et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees and 
Affirmance at 21, N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 831 F.3d 204 (No. 16-1468); Brief 
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some circuit court judges have opined on the potential 
constitutional problems of the results test.68 In this environment, 
voting rights advocates must not take the future of Section 2 as a 
given and must make strategic litigation choices to demonstrate 
that the vote denial results test stands on firm constitutional 
ground.69 They may do so by rebutting the two prevailing 
constitutional challenges to Section 2 to show that the results test 
effectively confronts the rise of modern and widespread voter 
suppression, without unduly intruding into local control of elections 
or commanding excessive race-consciousness. 
II. Constitutional Concerns About Section 2 
Although no federal court decision to date has held that the 
results test is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court may be inclined 
to eliminate or limit Section 2 in the vote denial context.70 There are 
several reasons why this risk to Section 2 must be taken seriously. 
First, the Supreme Court has explicitly left open the question of 
Section 2’s constitutionality,71 and over the last two decades, 
multiple justices have expressed serious doubts about the results 
 
of the Buckeye Inst. and the Jud. Educ. Project as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Defendants-Appellants and Reversal at 21–22, Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. 
Husted, 837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-3603), 2016 WL 3680235; Defendants’ 
Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 24, One Wis. Inst., Inc., 
No. 15-CV-324. 
 68. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bryant, 938 F.3d 134, 183–85 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., 
dissenting), reh’g en banc granted, 939 F.3d 629 (2019); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 
216, 314–18 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 
F.3d 305, 333 (2d Cir. 2006) (Walker, J., concurring); Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 
F.3d 1116, 1122–25 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Ala. State Conf. 
of NAACP v. Alabama, 949 F.3d 647, 655–59 (11th Cir. 2020) (Branch, J., dissenting) 
(writing that Section 2 must be significantly curtailed to comply with the Eleventh 
Amendment’s state sovereign immunity principles); Mich. State A. Philip Randolph 
Inst. v. Johnson, 749 F. App’x 342, 353 (6th Cir. 2018) (excluding certain balloting 
programs from the reach of Section 2 altogether). 
 69. See Hayden Johnson, Vote Denial and Defense: A Strategic Enforcement 
Proposal for Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 108 GEO. L.J. 449 (2019) (offering 
eight considerations to strategically pursue Section 2 vote denial cases). 
 70. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 382 (“Section 2 looks like a ripe target for a 
conservative Supreme Court.”); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act in the Hands of a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 125, 127 (2010) (“To date, however, the Supreme Court has left open the 
question whether section 2 is a constitutional exercise of congressional power.”); see 
also Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court May Soon Deal a Final, Fatal Blow to 
the Voting Rights Act, SLATE (Oct. 10, 2019, 5:45 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2019/10/supreme-court-voting-rights-act-obliteration.html [https://perma.cc/ 
PLC3-YR36] (discussing the potential constitutional challenge to Section 2).  
 71. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 127. 
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test.72 Second, proponents of restrictive voting laws have 
consistently argued that Section 2 is not “congruen[t] and 
proportional[]” to the harm it seeks to redress under the tailoring 
rule established in City of Boerne v. Flores.73 Third, the Supreme 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has tended to be very 
suspicious of race-conscious governmental actions, even when 
viewed by some as beneficial.74 Accordingly, the Roberts Court has 
generally disfavored antidiscrimination statutes that impose 
liability because of a challenged law or practice’s disparate impact 
on minority groups, as seen in the Fair Housing Act75 and Title VII76 
contexts. In sum, challengers to Section 2 contend that the statute 
is unconstitutional because it is purportedly untethered from its 
constitutional foundation and violates the Equal Protection Clause 
by requiring excessive consideration of race in electoral decision-
making.77 
As the Supreme Court weighs in on this long-brewing fight 
over Section 2,78 it could strike down the results test altogether and 
reimpose an intent-based standard. After all, the Court in 1980 did 
precisely that in City of Mobile v. Bolden,79 and the Roberts Court 
has shown a willingness to rebuff judicial minimalism in recent 
 
 72. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race and Representation 
Revisited: The New Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the VRA, 59 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1559, 1596 (2018) (“As many as four Justices are on record as 
skeptical of section 2. The Court may simply be of the view that section 2 is no longer 
necessary to enable voters of color to elect their candidates of choice.”). 
 73. See 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997) (ruling that statutory enforcement of the 
Reconstruction Amendments must be congruent and proportional to a record or 
threat of constitutional violations); see also Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 137 
(“[I]t is often noted that the Court offered the Voting Rights Act as an exemplary 
statute. The Court underscored often how [the Religious Freedom Restoration Act] 
was different in degree and kind from the VRA . . . . [However, S]ection 2 remained 
conspicuously absent from the discussion.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion) (rejecting voluntary school desegregation program 
and demanding colorblindness in efforts to promote racial inclusion because “[t]he 
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis 
of race”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 225–27 (1995) (holding 
that equal protection strict scrutiny analysis applies to federal laws that 
discriminate based on race, even when those laws have “benign” motives). 
 75. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
576 U.S. 519 (2015). 
 76. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 77. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 382 (summarizing that “if it is not clear 
what harms Section 2 guards against, and if Section 2 in practice precipitates racial 
conflict, then Section 2 is probably not a reasonable congressional remedy”). 
 78. See discussion supra note 33.  
 79. 446 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980) (holding that the original Section 2 “was intended 
to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself”). 
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election law cases such as Shelby County v. Holder, Citizens United 
v. FEC, and Abbott v. Perez.80 But the more likely route may be that 
the Court would follow the preferred incrementalist approach of 
Chief Justice Roberts,81 by which the Court could narrow the scope 
of Section 2’s applicability or impose more onerous evidentiary 
requirements (such as demanding proof of reduced minority turnout 
or more direct causation showings) to make successful results test 
litigation nearly impossible. Ultimately, though, the constitutional 
arguments against Section 2 should be rejected because the 
arguments in favor of Section 2’s constitutionality are much 
stronger than the claims against it. 
A. Forecasting the Roberts Court’s View of the Section 2 
Results Test 
Remarkably, the Supreme Court has never explicitly upheld 
Section 2’s results test as constitutional or even decided a Section 2 
vote denial case.82 Yet the continuous enforcement of the results 
test against a wide range of election laws in the lower courts and 
the Supreme Court’s reticence to weigh in may support an inference 
of constitutionality.83 The Court has also tacitly reaffirmed the 
constitutionality of the results test on three occasions.84 First, soon 
after the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, the Court 
summarily affirmed a three-judge panel’s decision upholding 
Section 2 as constitutional, sending the signal to lower courts that 
the results test should be followed.85 Second, in a 1996 racial 
redistricting case involving Section 2, called Bush v. Vera, Justice 
O’Connor wrote a concurrence that offered tepid support for the vote 
 
 80. See discussion infra notes 90, 104–109. 
 81. See Adam Liptak, Roberts’s Incremental Approach Frustrates Supreme Court 
Allies, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1raJ7lA [https://perma.cc/SR85-
ZQD8]. 
 82. Stephanopoulos, supra note 34, at 1572. 
 83. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990–92 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(citing cases upholding Section 2’s results test); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 965 
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming that the reinterpretation of Section 2 to 
limit its scope “would require overruling a sizable number of this Court’s 
precedents”). 
 84. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537 (2013); Vera, 517 U.S. at 992 
(O’Connor, J., concurring); Miss. Republican Exec. Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002, 
1002–03 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 85. See Miss. Republican Exec. Comm., 469 U.S. at 1002–03 (Stevens, J., 
concurring); see also Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1975) (“[L]ower courts 
are bound by summary decisions by this Court ‘until such time as the Court informs 
[them] that [they] are not.’”) (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). 
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dilution results test.86 She concluded that Section 2’s repeated 
application means that jurisdictions should “assume the 
constitutionality of §2 of the VRA, including the 1982 
amendments.”87 Third, and most recently, the Shelby County v. 
Holder decision referred to Section 2’s permanent, nationwide cause 
of action and potential to seek preliminary relief as support for its 
conclusion that Section 5’s preclearance coverage was no longer 
necessary.88 
These three instances and the consistent application of 
Section 2’s results test to vote denial laws in the lower courts may 
provide cold comfort to voting rights advocates in the current legal 
environment. In recent terms, multiple different coalitions of 
justices were willing to overrule longstanding precedents.89 
Concerning election law in particular, the Roberts Court has 
circumscribed even recent precedential decisions multiple times 
over the past decade.90 And specifically related to Section 2, some 
election law academics have suggested that prior cases interpreting 
Section 2 are entitled to lesser precedential deference under the 
 
 86. Vera, 517 U.S. at 992 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (approvingly citing twelve 
lower court decisions upholding Section 2 and ruling that the results test “is an 
important part of the apparatus chosen by Congress to effectuate this Nation’s 
commitment ‘to confront its conscience and fulfill the guarantee of the Constitution’ 
with respect to equality in voting” (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 4 (1982))). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See 570 U.S. at 537 (observing that “[b]oth the Federal Government and 
individuals have sued to enforce §2, and injunctive relief is available in appropriate 
cases to block voting laws from going into effect. Section 2 is permanent, applies 
nationwide, and is not at issue in this case”) (internal citations omitted). But see 
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55, 
58 (2013) (disagreeing with the Shelby County majority that preliminary relief is 
actually available under Section 2, given that “the proportion of Section 2 suits in 
which preliminary injunctions are granted is quite small, certainly no higher than 
25 percent and probably lower than 5 percent”). 
 89. See, e.g., Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170 (2019) (overruling 
Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)); 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019) (overruling Nevada v. Hall, 
440 U.S. 410 (1979)); Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2479 (2018) 
(overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)); South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018) (overruling Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)); see also Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and 
Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV. 157, 160–61 (2018) (“[D]uring the Roberts 
Court’s first decade, the Court’s textualist or textualist-leaning Justices repeatedly 
have called for overruling a statutory precedent, even when doing so would upset 
settled expectations.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 556–57 (abrogating Lopez v. Monterey 
Cnty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); 
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
383 U.S. 301 (1966)); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652 (1990) and overruling in 
part McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)). 
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doctrine of stare decisis.91 Moreover, even the Court’s prior swing 
votes, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, were apprehensive about 
using Section 2 to increase electoral opportunities for minority 
groups at the expense of other state interests, and criticized the 
apparent racial divisiveness that VRA enforcement perpetuates.92 
In recent years, the Court has become more ideologically 
conservative,93 particularly after the passing of the Court’s 
staunchest VRA defender, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.94 
 
 91. See Elmendorf, supra note 62, at 448–55 (suggesting that Section 2 is a 
“common law statute” and its precedents may be entitled to a weaker stare decisis 
protection); Pitts, supra note 62, at 4 (citing Elmendorf’s proposition). 
 92. Justice Kennedy continuously cast doubt on the status of Section 2, writing 
for the Court and separately on several occasions to deliberately leave the results 
test’s legitimacy open to challenge. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 
(2009) (warning that too much Section 2 race consciousness would “infuse” racial 
considerations into every redistricting decision and that “[t]o the extent there is any 
doubt whether §2 calls for the majority-minority rule, we resolve that doubt by 
avoiding serious constitutional concerns under the Equal Protection Clause”); 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 405–06 (2006) 
(cautioning that interpreting Section 2 to protect influence districts would 
“unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redistricting”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900, 927 (1995) (recognizing that although the VRA “has been of vital 
importance in eradicating invidious discrimination from the electoral process and 
enhancing the legitimacy of our political institutions,” its purpose “is neither assured 
nor well served . . . by carving electorates into racial blocs”); Johnson v. De Grandy, 
512 U.S. 997, 1028–29 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“It is important to emphasize that the precedents to which I refer, like today’s 
decision, only construe [Section 2], and do not purport to assess its constitutional 
implications.”) (internal citations omitted); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 418 
(1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (writing pointedly that “[n]othing in today’s decision 
addresses the question whether § 2 . . . , as interpreted in Thornburg v. Gingles, is 
consistent with the requirements of the United States Constitution”) (internal 
citation omitted). Justice O’Connor echoed Kennedy’s opposition to race-conscious 
redistricting, emphasizing that, “[r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial 
purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us 
further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal 
that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630, 657 (1993). 
 93. See Adam Liptak, Barrett’s Record: A Conservative Who Would Push the 
Supreme Court to the Right, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2020), https://nyti.ms/36WTep2 
[https://perma.cc/WE9C-TQYP]; Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, How Amy Coney 
Barrett Could Change the Supreme Court, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 25, 2020), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-amy-coney-barrett-could-change-the-
supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/4BNH-7SAL] (suggesting that, according to one 
empirical measure of judicial ideology, Chief Justice Roberts would “no longer be the 
court’s median”). 
 94. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 590 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“Throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to 
work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a 
rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”); see also Richard Hasen,  
Symposium: Ginsburg Was a Champion of Voting Rights, but Mostly in Dissent, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/09/symposium-
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Of the current members of the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas 
has provided the most sweeping critique of Section 2, specifically in 
the vote dilution context.95 Justice Thomas wrote in a concurrence 
in the 1994 Holder v. Hall case that “few devices could be better 
designed to exacerbate racial tensions than the consciously 
segregated districting system currently being constructed in the 
name of the Voting Rights Act.”96 Justice Scalia signed on to 
Thomas’ perspective,97 and recently in the 2017 Abbott v. Perez case, 
Justice Gorsuch has followed suit.98 But Thomas also elaborated at 
length in Holder v. Hall that Section 2 can only apply to voting 
participation restrictions, perhaps indicating that he would be more 
willing to find the results test is still constitutional in the vote 
denial context.99 
On balance, though, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch may be 
hostile to non-intent focused analyses in voting100 or other civil 
rights areas that could be viewed as “progressive causes”101 and 




 95. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892–93 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); see 
also Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 142–43 (“Justices Thomas and Scalia 
have . . . remonstrated against the use of race in elections and the constitutionality 
of the VRA.”). 
 96. Hall, 512 U.S. at 907; see also Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1485–86 
(2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (reiterating that compliance with Section 2 cannot 
be used to justify a racial gerrymander). 
 97. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 512 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (finding that Section 2 “continues to drift ever further 
from the [VRA]’s purpose of ensuring minority voters equal electoral opportunities”). 
 98. 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2335 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Gorsuch, J.) 
(voting to join Justice Thomas’ “view that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 does 
not apply to redistricting”). 
 99. Hall, 512 U.S. at 945 (Thomas, J., concurring) (surveying the text and context 
of Section 2 and concluding that the results test applies “only to state enactments 
that regulate citizens’ access to the ballot or the processes for counting a ballot”). 
 100. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 558 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the 
Court should have gone further to eliminate Section 5 protections altogether because 
“[h]owever one aggregates the data compiled by Congress, it cannot justify the 
considerable burdens created by § 5”); Lopez, 525 U.S. at 293 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(collecting cases discussing how “Section 5 is a unique requirement that exacts 
significant federalism costs”). 
 101. Neil M. Gorsuch, Liberals’N’Lawsuits, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Feb. 7, 2005), 
www.nationalreview.com/2005/02/liberalsnlawsuits-joseph-6/ [https://perma.cc/ 
A4AG-VZ3U] (arguing against liberal causes using litigation to counter 
discrimination and warning that “as Republicans win presidential and Senate 
elections and thus gain increasing control over the judicial appointment and 
confirmation process, the level of sympathy liberals pushing constitutional litigation 
can expect in the courts may wither over time, leaving the Left truly out in the cold”); 
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Justice Alito has also generally advanced more stringent views 
on results-oriented antidiscrimination statutes102 and has sought to 
reshape the legal landscape to remove key federal oversights over 
local control of elections.103 In Abbott v. Perez, for example, Alito 
wrote the majority opinion and articulated a narrow conception of 
Section 2’s role in checking a jurisdiction’s management of its 
elections.104 Alito concluded that because election regulation “is 
primarily the duty and responsibility of the State,” “[f]ederal-court 
review of districting legislation represents a serious intrusion on 
the most vital of local functions” and the “good faith of [a] state 
legislature must be presumed.”105 By giving states this benefit of 
the doubt, the Abbott decision ratcheted up the burden of proving a 
jurisdiction acted with discriminatory intent.106  
 
see also Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. Saint George City, 685 F.3d 917, 
923–24 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J.) (asserting a caged view of the Fair Housing Act 
disparate impact test related to housing for persons with disabilities). 
 102. For example, as a judge on the Third Circuit, Alito sought to increase the 
evidentiary burden for plaintiffs to prove workplace race discrimination under Title 
VII. See Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 999 (3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). The majority opinion in Bray v. Marriott Hotels wholly rejected Alito’s 
reading of the law, stating that “Title VII would be eviscerated if our analysis were 
to halt where the dissent suggests.” Id. at 993 (majority opinion). 
 103. One scholar has broadly contended that Justices Thomas and Alito “believe 
that any federal interference with the state’s power over voter qualifications is 
unconstitutional.” See Franita Tolson, The Elections Clause and the 
Underenforcement of Federal Law, 129 YALE L.J.F. 171, 175–76 (2019). Justice Alito 
has been a consistent voice against the Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote 
doctrine and wrote in a job application personal statement explaining his lifelong 
conservatism and that his interest in constitutional law was “motivated in large part 
by disagreement with Warren Court decisions, particularly in the areas 
of . . . reapportionment.” See Samuel Alito, Personal Qualifications Statement (Nov. 
15, 1985), www.npr.org/documents/2005/nov/alito/alitoabortion.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/T953-P6MY]. In accordance with this view, Justice Alito in 2016 raised the 
possibility of changing the longstanding meaning of one-person, one-vote 
jurisprudence to provide states greater deference in redistricting, see Evenwel v. 
Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1144–45 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring), which contributed to 
a flash point during the 2019 census citizenship question litigation, see Richard L. 
Hasen, New Memo Reveals the Census Question Was Added to Boost White Voting 
Power, SLATE (May 30, 2019, 11:59 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2019/05/census-memo-supreme-court-conservatives-white-voters-alito.html 
[https://perma.cc/TK42-EVHN]. 
 104. See Perez, 138 S. Ct. at 2313–14 (concluding that all but one of Texas’ 
legislative districts are lawful under Section 2). 
 105. Id. at 2324 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995)). The view Alito 
expressed in Abbott v. Perez is consistent with his dissent in a prior voting 
registration case, in which he argued that courts must defer to local administration 
of elections and “begin by applying a presumption against pre-emption of” the state 
voting law. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 39 (2013) (Alito, 
J., dissenting). 
 106. See Richard L. Hasen, Suppression of Minority Voting Rights Is About to Get 
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The Abbott Court also reached the merits only by eschewing 
judicial minimalism to review the case before a final injunction 
order and assertively displaced the trial court’s factual findings 
regarding intentional discrimination.107 In response, Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent warned of the potentially larger import of 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion on Section 2, claiming that the 
majority went “out of its way” to set aside the lower court’s 
unanimous finding that Texas’ revised electoral maps “were 
adopted for the purpose of preserving the racial discrimination that 
tainted its previous maps.”108 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor 
emphasized that the Abbott majority had prioritized the 
“presumption of good faith” of a legislature “at serious costs to our 
democracy,” and contrary to the record of intentional discrimination 
in Texas and the purposes of Section 2.109 
Justices Alito and Sotomayor similarly wrote opinions on 
opposite sides of a 2018 case called Husted v. A. Philip Randolph 
Institute,110 which concerned the methods states may use to remove 
voters from their registration rolls under the National Voter 
Registration Act (NVRA).111 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito 
concluded that Ohio’s method of classifying and removing allegedly 
ineligible voters complied with the NVRA, including the 
requirement that registration programs must conform with the 
VRA and Section 2’s results-oriented prohibition of discriminatory 
voting laws.112 Dissenting, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that 
Ohio’s registration removal “[p]rocess has disproportionately 
affected minority, low-income, disabled, and veteran voters”113 and 
noted that in one county, “African–American–majority 
neighborhoods in downtown Cincinnati had 10% of their voters 
removed due to inactivity since 2012, as ‘compared to only 4% of 
voters in a suburban, majority-White neighborhood,’” a likely 
 
Way Worse, SLATE (June 25, 2018, 2:20 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2018/06/the-abbott-v-perez-case-echoes-shelby-county-v-holder-as-a-
further-death-blow-for-the-voting-rights-act.html [https://perma.cc/PZL9-QFYF]. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Perez, 138 S. Ct. at 2335 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2360 
(quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)) (arguing the court ignored 
proper procedures “to allow Texas to use electoral maps that, in design and effect, 
burden the rights of minority voters to exercise that most precious right that is 
‘preservative of all rights’”). 
 109. Id. at 2346. 
 110. See Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. at 1840, 1848 (articulating the NVRA’s requirements and finding that 
Ohio complied). 
 113. Id. at 1864 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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sufficient disparate impact under part one of the vote denial results 
test.114 Justice Sotomayor’s opinion also noted that the majority had 
ignored the state’s history of voter suppression and the purpose 
behind voting rights legislation to enfranchise more people, not to 
justify unnecessarily removing eligible voters from the registration 
rolls.115 Although Husted did not involve Section 2 directly, the two 
opinions may indicate how the Court would address a results test 
challenge to alleged discrimination in state maintenance of 
registration rolls, and the likelihood that, similar to Abbott v. Perez, 
the Court may also view Section 2 as improperly second-guessing 
local electoral choices.116 
Justice Kavanaugh may prove decisive for the future of the 
VRA.117 Though he never reviewed a Section 2 case as a D.C. Circuit 
judge, Kavanaugh’s potential views may be revealed by a 2012 
Section 5 case in which he wrote the majority opinion approving 
South Carolina’s voter ID law.118 There, Judge Kavanaugh ruled 
that the challenged law did not offend the even more protective 
 
 114. Id. (quoting Brief for NAACP & The Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833 
(2018) (No. 16-980)); see also USCCR Report, supra note 13, at 144–57 (documenting 
disproportionate impact of voter registration list purges in several states). 
 115. Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1865. 
 116. See Lisa Marshall Manheim & Elizabeth G. Porter, The Elephant in the 
Room: Intentional Voter Suppression, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 219 (2018) (“Husted 
underscores the Supreme Court’s willingness to use its limited institutional 
resources and massive institutional power not to protect voters, but instead to aid 
and abet a rollback of voting rights.”); Richard L. Hasen, Sonia Sotomayor’s Dissent 
in the Big Voter-Purge Case Points to How the Law Might Still be Struck Down, 
SLATE (June 11, 2018, 12:33 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/sonia-
sotomayors-husted-dissentpoints-the-way-forward-on-racist-voter-purge-laws.html 
[https://perma.cc/T3Q3-YLJG]. 
 117. See Adam Liptak, How Brett Kavanaugh Would Transform the Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2N3M5d1 [https://perma.cc/RP9K-
B929] (predicting that Kavanaugh’s appointment will lead to “a solid five-member 
conservative majority that would most likely . . . uphold voting restrictions [and] 
strike down campaign finance regulations”). In addition, Kavanaugh’s view on voting 
rights may also be influenced by his “colorblind” approach to the Constitution, having 
previously written “in a newspaper column that the Supreme Court would 
eventually, inevitably find that ‘in the eyes of government, we are just one race.’” 
Ann E. Marimow, Brett Kavanaugh Once Predicted ‘One Race’ in the Eyes of 





 118. See South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2012) (three-
judge panel). 
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Section 5 retrogression standard119 because a reasonable 
impediment exception ameliorated the law’s burden on minority 
voters.120 In upholding the voter ID law, Kavanaugh brushed past 
the reality that the exception mitigated the discriminatory burden 
merely because South Carolina had broadly reinterpreted the 
provision during the course of litigation (a point recognized by the 
concurrence),121 and only passingly acknowledged evidence of the 
state legislature’s racially discriminatory motive.122 Moreover, in an 
earlier discovery order, Kavanaugh wanted to shield material 
prepared by state legislature staff attorneys while drafting the 
voter ID law, which may have blinded the court to other potential 
evidence of discriminatory intent.123 In addition, during his 2018 
confirmation hearing, Kavanaugh was evasive about his stance on 
the constitutionality of Section 2124 and the existence of voter 
fraud,125 offering few assurances for the future of a results test 
applied to vote denial laws. 
 
 119. A voting law change violates Section 5 if data shows the status of minority 
voters would “retrogress” or worsen under the law when compared to the status quo 
ante. See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
 120. See South Carolina, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 39. 
 121. Id. at 54 (Bates, J., concurring); see also Richard Hasen, Softening Voter ID 
Laws Through Litigation: Is It Enough?, 2016 WIS. L. REV. FORWARD 100, 108 (2016) 
(“There is little doubt South Carolina adopted this softening solely to obtain 
preclearance from the court.”). 
 122. The record included an email between a State Representative and a 
supporter of the voter ID bill, with the supporter writing that Black voters “would 
be like a swarm of bees going after a watermelon” if they were offered $100 dollars 
to obtain a voter ID. The Representative responded “Amen . . . . Thank you for your 
support of voter ID.” NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD OF JUDGE BRETT KAVANAUGH, 58 (2018), 
www.naacpldf.org/files/our-work/FINAL_Report%20on%20Brett%20Kavanaugh_ 
FINAL_11_22.pdf [https://perma.cc/C26M-W9S9]. The exchange took place after the 
bill was passed. Id. Judge Kavanaugh glossed over the exchange and indicated that 
the court was “troubled,” but denied that it proved discriminatory intent. See South 
Carolina, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 45. 
 123. See Order at 9–10, South Carolina v. United States, No. 1:12-cv-00203 
(D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 124. Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, 
Part 5, at 1:41:26–1:41:55, C-SPAN (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?449705-15/supreme-court-nominee-brett-kavanaugh-confirmation-
hearing-day-2-part-5&playEvent&start=5914 (showing video recording of Justice 
Kavanaugh hesitating “to pre-commit” on the constitutionality of Section 2 in 
response to questioning from then-Senator Kamala Harris). 
 125. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Brett M. Kavanaugh to be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, (Day 
3), at 5:37:20–5:38:36, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 6, 2019), 
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/nomination-of-the-honorable-brett-m-
kavanaugh-to-be-an-associate-justice-of-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states-
day-3 (regarding the existence of voter fraud, Judge Kavanaugh responded to 
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Recently appointed Justice Barrett’s record provides few 
reliable signposts for predicting her potential views on the VRA. In 
the sole voting rights merits decision she wrote during her time on 
the Seventh Circuit, Justice Barrett ruled against the plaintiff on 
his constitutional claim.126 In a dissenting opinion in which Justice 
Barrett contested firearm ownership limitations imposed on certain 
individuals convicted of felony offenses, Justice Barrett 
distinguished deprivations of gun rights from voting rights by 
emphasizing that “founding-era legislatures imposed virtue-based 
restrictions” on “civic rights like voting and jury service, not to 
individual rights like the right to possess a gun.”127 Commentators 
and journalists also noted Justice Barrett’s dodging answers during 
her 2020 confirmation hearing on even seemingly low-stakes voting 
rights questions, such as whether voter intimidation is unlawful 
under federal law or if she agreed with Chief Justice Roberts’ 
statement in Shelby County v. Holder that “[v]oting discrimination 
still exists.”128 Thus, of the scant information available, Justice 
Barrett’s vote to uphold an effective Section 2 results test is far from 
a sure conclusion. 
 
Senator Amy Klobuchar: “I hesitate to opine on . . . something I read in the law 
review article or blog . . . . I would want a record in a particular case to determine 
what the evidence in the particular case was.”). 
 126. See Acevedo v. Cook Cnty. Officers Electoral Bd., 925 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(involving a candidate’s constitutional claim concerning ballot access); see also 
Democratic Party of Wis. v. Vos, 966 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2020) (joining opinion 
rejecting constitutional voting rights claims based on standing and justiciability); 
McDonald v. Cook Cnty. Officers Electoral Bd., 758 F. App’x 527 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(rejecting constitutional voting rights claims based on mootness).  
 127. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).  
 128. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Amy Coney Barrett Grilled on Voting Rights as 2020 
Election Is Underway, CNN (Oct. 13, 2020), www.cnn.com/2020/10/14/politics/voting-
rights-amy-coney-barrett-shelby-county/index.html [https://perma.cc/8AVL-FA5C]; 
Press Release, The Leadership Conf. on Civ. and Hum. Rights, Nine Voting Rights 
and Democracy Questions Judge Barrett Refused to Answer (Oct. 20, 2020), 
https://civilrights.org/blog/nine-voting-rights-and-democracy-questions-judge-
barrett-refused-to-answer/ [https://perma.cc/7PUR-TV74]. Justice Barrett’s 
academic publications are also unrevealing of her potential voting rights 
jurisprudence, though many of her writings speak to a philosophy of judicial 
minimalism that prioritizes deference to the choices of political entities accountable 
to voters. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Book Review, Countering the Majoritarian 
Difficulty, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 61, 76 (2017) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR 
REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE 
PEOPLE) (critiquing the author’s view of judicial power, arguing that judicial review 
is a “power” and not a “duty,” and that “the courts must be cognizant of the limits 
upon their judicial power”). 
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Finally, Chief Justice Roberts’ current views of the propriety 
of Section 2’s results test may also be in question.129 In the early 
1980s after he clerked for Justice Rehnquist,130 Roberts lobbied 
against the 1982 results test amendment to Section 2 and penned 
several memoranda to Reagan Justice Department officials making 
his case. In his memos, Roberts warned that a Section 2 results test 
would effectively impose the Section 5 retrogression standard 
nationwide, which he argued was in violation of the intent of the 
Framers and the Congress that enacted the VRA in 1965.131 He 
criticized that a results standard “establish[ed] a ‘right’ in racial 
and language minorities to electoral representation proportional to 
their population in the community.”132 From this early point, 
Roberts also raised constitutional concerns about Section 2: “[T]he 
constitutional standard of intent is now set for the Fifteenth 
Amendment, and Congress cannot change that. It can change the 
statutory standard, in § 2, but that would be severing the statute 
from its constitutional base and creating great uncertainty.”133 
Some of Roberts’ concerns about Section 2 materialized in a 2006 
vote dilution case called LULAC v. Perry.134 There, Chief Justice 
Roberts dissented from the majority’s application of Section 2, 
concluding that he “[did] not believe it is [the Court’s] role to make 
judgments about which mixes of minority voters should count for 
purposes of forming a majority in an electoral district . . . . It is a 
 
 129. See BERMAN, supra note 17, at 152 (quoting voting rights advocate Gerry 
Hebert for his view that “John [Roberts] seemed like he always had it in for the 
Voting Rights Act. I remember him being a zealot when it came to having 
fundamental suspicions about the Voting Rights Act’s utility”). 
 130. Chief Justice Roberts’ jurisprudence is influenced by former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, who once wrote a dissenting opinion criticizing the VRA and stating that 
“[t]he enforcement provisions of the Civil War Amendments were not premised on 
the notion that Congress could empower a later generation of blacks to ‘get even’ for 
wrongs inflicted on their forebears.” City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 218 
(1980); see also Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy: The Supreme Court’s Stealth 
Hard-Liner, NEW YORKER (May 25, 2009), www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2009/05/25/no-more-mr-nice-guy [https://perma.cc/9WL5-JYEC] (detailing Chief 
Justice Roberts’ relationship with Justice Rehnquist). 
 131. See BERMAN, supra note 17, at 150–51; see also Records Pertaining to John 
G. Roberts, Jr., NAT’L ARCHIVES, www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/ 
accession-60-89-0372 [https://perma.cc/SY8K-TRHD]. 
 132. Memorandum from John Roberts, Special Assistant to the Att’y Gen., to the 
Att’y Gen., Why Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Should Be Retained Unchanged, 
at 2 (Dec. 22, 1981), https://www.archives.gov/files/news/john-roberts/accession-60-
88-0498/030-black-binder1/folder030.pdf [https://perma.cc/64RS-YPXF]. 
 133. Memorandum from John Roberts, Special Assistant to the Att’y Gen., to the 
Att’y Gen., Today’s Post Ed., at 2 (Jan. 26, 1982), https://www.archives.gov/files/ 
news/john-roberts/accession-60-88-0498/030-black-binder1/folder030.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/64RS-YPXF] (emphasis in original). 
 134. See 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
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sordid business, this divvying us up by race.”135 To the extent 
Roberts believes Section 2’s vote denial results test also requires too 
much race-consciousness, he may think the test violates his 
“colorblind” interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.136 
B. Two Constitutional Challenges to Section 2 
The arguments Chief Justice Roberts and other justices have 
raised against Section 2 and related election law doctrines remain 
a threat to the vote denial results test, and opponents of this 
provision have endeavored to tee-up two questions concerning 
Section 2’s constitutionality to test the Court’s apprehension.137 The 
first theory that Section 2 is unconstitutional relies upon many of 
the same purported federalism and enforcement power defects that 
arose in Shelby County v. Holder and Northwest Austin v. Holder (a 
precursor case to the facial challenge of the VRA’s preclearance 
scheme).138 The argument is that Section 2 exceeds the permissible 
scope of Congress’ remedial power to enforce the Reconstruction 
Amendments “by appropriate legislation,”139 given the tailoring rule 
the Supreme Court established in City of Boerne v. Flores.140 This 
contention critically portrays Section 2 as an impermissible 
 
 135. Id. at 511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part). 
 136. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 
(2007) (plurality opinion) (rejecting voluntary school desegregation program and 
demanding colorblindness in efforts to promote racial inclusion because “[t]he way 
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race”); see also Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round 
Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 585 (2003) (“[R]ise of individualist and colorblind 
values in the generation since Davis now makes it necessary to consider a third issue: 
the affirmative tension between equal protection and disparate impact statutes.”). 
 137. See supra notes 32–33, 67–68; see also Ho, supra note 63, at 824 (quoting 
Abbott v. Veasey, 137 S. Ct. 612, 613 (2017), and citing North Carolina v. N.C. State 
Conf. of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399, 1400 (2017)) (observing that in denying 
certiorari in the Texas and North Carolina vote denial cases, “[t]he Chief Justice 
pointedly noted that ‘[t]he issues will be better suited for certiorari review’ after final 
judgment, all but promising that the Supreme Court will eventually take the case”); 
see also Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 139 S. Ct. 50 (2018) 
(denying application to vacate the Circuit Court’s stay of the District Court’s 
permanent injunction of Michigan’s elimination of straight-ticket voting). Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented in the denial of the application to vacate stay. Id.  
 138. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2008) 
(raising issues with Section 5 a year before Shelby County, but applying the 
constitutional avoidance canon to rule narrowly); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 
848, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (determining that the Supreme Court has “sen[t] a powerful 
signal that congruence and proportionality is the appropriate standard of review”). 
 139. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.  
 140. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1122–25 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (analyzing whether Section 2’s results test fails the Boerne 
“congruence and proportionality” test). 
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substantive rather than remedial statute, and often attacks Section 
2’s scope in two forms: temporally and geographically. 
The second challenge to Section 2 concerns an alleged conflict 
between the disparate impact component of the results test and the 
Court’s usual interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to 
command racial neutrality in antidiscrimination laws. The Court in 
recent years has addressed a variation of this conflict in the Fair 
Housing Act context in Texas Department of Housing and 
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project141 and Title 
VII context in Ricci v. DeStefano,142 where the Roberts Court has 
remained wary of disparate impact statutes favoring racial 
minorities at the perceived expense of other races or interests. 
Proponents of restrictive voting laws argue that a disparate impact 
reading of Section 2 also encourages too much race-conscious 
decision-making, while employing a facile, retrogression-like 
standard to strike down useful and generally applicable electoral 
regulations.143 
Both constitutional threats are analyzed below. Although the 
calls to reexamine the constitutionality of Section 2 have become 
louder in recent years from both advocates and commentators, these 
contentions are ultimately unfounded and the prevailing two-part 
results test stands on firm constitutional ground. 
i. City of Boerne “Congruence and Proportionality” 
Challenge to Section 2 
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court announced a 
new tailoring limit on congressional authority to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment: Congress’ enforcement power is strictly 
“remedial,” and statutes protecting the Amendment’s substantive 
rights must have “a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that 
end.”144 Lacking such a connection, enforcement legislation may 
 
 141. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 
519, 543–44 (2015) (upholding but limiting the Fair Housing Act’s disparate impact 
standard). 
 142. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009) (upholding but limiting a 
disparate impact standard in the Title VII employment context). 
 143. See Johnson, supra note 66, at 2 (arguing that the Section 2 results test looks 
too much like retrogression and should be curtailed for that reason); see also Chief 
Justice Roberts’ Memos, supra notes 130–133 and accompanying text. 
 144. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997). But see Tennessee v. 
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557–58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Boerne test 
as “a standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven 
decisionmaking”). 
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improperly become “substantive in operation and effect.”145 
Applying this test, the Boerne Court held unconstitutional part of 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),146 which Congress 
passed to statutorily circumvent a then-recently narrowed 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.147 
Proponents of voting restrictions have repeatedly raised the 
Boerne framework as a basis for holding Section 2 
unconstitutional,148 and the decision’s reasoning may be relevant to 
the future of the results test along several dimensions. Although 
Boerne twice pointed to the VRA as the model for appropriate 
enforcement legislation,149 the decision references cases discussing 
Section 5, and Shelby County effectively nullified that provision and 
went to great lengths to avoid opining on the asserted Boerne 
issues.150 The threat the Boerne rule poses, in a nutshell, arises from 
the fact that Section 2 establishes an objective, results-oriented 
standard, but the Reconstruction Amendments prohibit only 
subjective, intentional discrimination.151 As such, the Court may 
 
 145. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–20; see also id. at 525 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. 3, 13–14 (1883), for proposition that Congress may not pass “general 
legislation” under the Fourteenth Amendment, and must instead only enact 
“corrective legislation”); Jennifer G. Presto, The 1982 Amendments to Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act: Constitutionality After City of Boerne, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 609, 615 (2004) (analyzing the Court’s remedial limits); Nelson, supra note 63, at 
591 (describing the “congruence and proportionality” of Section 2). 
 146. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (holding unconstitutional RFRA’s state and local 
government provisions). 
 147. See id. at 512–15; see also Emp. Div., Dept. of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause “does 
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct 
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)’” (citation omitted)); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, 
Linking the Questions: Judicial Supremacy as a Matter of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1309, 1349 (2012) (describing Boerne as an 
assertion of judicial supremacy over the Constitution, in response to Congress’ 
attempted disavowal of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause holding in 
Employment Division v. Smith). 
 148. For briefs, articles, and opinions raising Boerne-based constitutional 
arguments against Section 2, see supra notes 32, 66–68. 
 149. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532–33; Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 253 n.47 (5th 
Cir. 2016) (en banc) (noting that Boerne used the VRA as a model of appropriately 
congruent and proportional legislation). 
 150. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 137 (“[I]t is often noted that the Court 
offered the Voting Rights Act as an exemplary statute. The Court underscored often 
how RFRA was different in degree and kind from the VRA.” However, 
“Section 2 remained conspicuously absent from the discussion.”). 
 151. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2162 (2015); 
see also Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 137 (“[I]f City of Boerne serves as guide, 
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apply Boerne to hold the vote denial results test unconstitutional 
because, like RFRA, Section 2 attempts to change the substantive 
constitutional right at issue and lacks a sufficient nexus to the 
temporal and geographic scope of intentional voting discrimination. 
a. Boerne Problem One: Judicial Supremacy and Remedial 
Mandate 
First, Section 2 may be at risk if the Court construes the 
results test as a substantive rather than remedial provision. In 
Boerne, the Court asserted its judicial supremacy to reaffirm that 
although Congress may have the first pass at determining what 
legislation is required to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court has the last word on the substantive right to be enforced.152 
In the Court’s words, Congress “has been given the power ‘to 
enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a 
constitutional violation.”153 And while Congress may enact 
“[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional 
violations . . . even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not 
itself unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of 
autonomy previously reserved to the States,”154 it cannot too far 
exceed the Court’s interpretation of the bounds of the underlying 
constitutional right.155 Because RFRA came on the heels of the 
Court’s narrowing of the Free Exercise Clause,156 the Boerne Court 
determined that the legislation looked too much like Congress 
trying to use its legislative enforcement power to reinstall an 
 
it is hard to believe that the Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982 will survive this 
kind of judicial review.”). But see Travis Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth 
Amendment?, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1549, 1563 (2020) (noting that the Court has not 
been “clear about whether the intent requirement applies to the Fifteenth 
Amendment”). 
 152. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (“It is for Congress in the first instance to determine 
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and its conclusions are entitled to much deference. Congress’ discretion 
is not unlimited, however, and the courts retain the power, as they have since 
Marbury v. Madison, to determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the 
Constitution.” (citations and quotations omitted)). 
 153. Id. at 519. 
 154. Id. at 518 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 155. Id. at 519 (rejecting “the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree 
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States” because 
“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is”); see 
also Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 151, at 2163 (analyzing the relationship 
between Congress and the Court); Presto, supra note 145, at 616 (same). 
 156. See Emp. Div., Dept. of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
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overruled constitutional interpretation of individual religious 
rights, thereby usurping the judiciary’s proper role.157 
In a somewhat similar fashion, the 1982 Congress amended 
Section 2 to expressly adopt a results test as a direct response to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in City of Mobile v. Bolden, in which the 
Court held that Section 2’s original language could only support an 
intent test in accordance with the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
standard.158 By reinstating a results test, opponents of Section 2 
could argue that the 1982 Congress did not merely provide a 
prophylactic protection for the constitutional right to vote, but 
instead used a statute to amend the Constitution and redefine the 
substance of that right.159 As such, the amended Section 2 is said to 
“be noncongruent and disproportionate because it prohibits a broad 
swath of conduct that is constitutionally innocuous: governmental 
activity that lacks a discriminatory purpose but produces a 
disparate impact.”160  
b. Boerne Problem Two: Limitations on Temporal and 
Geographic Scope 
Second, the Boerne Court’s tailoring restrictions on Congress’ 
remedial power may also pose a problem for Section 2’s 
constitutional status. The Boerne Court held that a Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement statute must be tied with some degree of 
specificity to the constitutional injury it seeks to redress, both 
 
 157. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536; see also Abu El-Haj, supra note 147, at 1349.  
 158. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980) (finding that the original 
Section 2 “was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth 
Amendment itself”); see also Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 129 (“On its face, it 
is clear that [the original] Section 2 was only codifying the Fifteenth Amendment, 
and both the Attorney General and leading members of Congress said as much 
during the hearings in 1965.”). But see Crum, supra note 151, at 1563, 1627 
(challenging whether the Fifteenth Amendment requires discriminatory intent). 
 159. As the 1982 Senate Report made clear, the “principal reason” for statutorily 
overruling Mobile v. Bolden and rejecting an intent-based analysis “is that, simply 
put, the test asks the wrong question.” S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 36; see also Michael T. 
Morley, Prophylactic Redistricting? Congress’s Section 5 Power and the New Equal 
Protection Right to Vote, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2053, 2085 (2018) (comparing the 
history of Section 2 and RFRA); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 751 (1998) (analyzing the effect of Boerne on 
the vote dilution results test). For commentators analyzing the substantive nature 
of Section 2, see Presto, supra note 145, at 626; Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 
143–44; Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 151, at 2158. 
 160. Stephanopoulos, supra note 34, at 1593; see also Morley, supra note 159, at 
2077 (noting that Boerne is “[e]specially concerning from a voting rights perspective” 
because “the Court has taken a dim view of statutes aimed primarily at eliminating 
disparate impacts that do not themselves violate the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
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temporally and geographically.161 Temporally, the Court pointed to 
weaknesses in the RFRA legislative record, concluding that it “lacks 
examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed 
because of religious bigotry. The history of persecution in this 
country detailed in the hearings mentions no episodes occurring in 
the past 40 years.”162 The record’s lack of modern examples of 
religious discrimination persuaded the Boerne Court that the 
statute was noncongruent and nonproportional to the constitutional 
harm.163 
Notwithstanding the reality that discriminatory restrictions 
on voting and registration are increasingly pervasive today,164 a 
constitutional claim against Section 2 may raise a similar Boerne-
based temporal scope argument. One scholar has called this issue 
the “Bull Connor is dead” problem: When Congress enacted the VRA 
in 1965 and amended it in 1982, the record was replete with 
examples of intentional voting discrimination in the states, but with 
the use of more deceptive and subtler discriminatory practices 
today, Congress “may be hard-pressed to find widespread evidence 
of such discrimination.”165 The Supreme Court in both Shelby 
County and Northwest Austin expressed strong condemnation of the 
idea that Congress can continue providing a voting rights remedy 
with high perceived federalism costs based on discriminatory voting 
conditions supposedly eliminated decades ago.166 As Chief Justice 
Roberts stated for the Shelby County majority, “[o]ur country has 
changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, 
Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that 
 
 161. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529–31. 
 162. Id. at 530. 
 163. See id. at 530–32. 
 164. For descriptions of the rise in vote denial restrictions across the country, see 
generally the civil rights reports cited supra note 38. 
 165. Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions 
of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 179 (2005); 
see also Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights 
and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 730 (1998) (noting that 
Kennedy’s Boerne opinion’s “discussion of RFRA’s legislative record at least raises 
the possibility of some kind of durational constraint” on Congress’ enforcement 
power); Franita Tolson, What Is Abridgment?: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 
ALA. L. REV. 433, 452–53 (2015) (noting that Shelby County “reflected long-standing 
concerns that Congress had not built a sufficient record of intentional racial 
discrimination in voting to justify the continued use of this particular remedy”). 
 166. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 553 (2013) (ruling that disrupting 
traditional federalism and equal sovereignty principles must be done “on a basis that 
makes sense in light of current conditions”); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (stating that the VRA “imposes current burdens 
and must be justified by current needs”). 
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problem speaks to current conditions.”167 Applying this principle to 
the VRA’s preclearance formula, the Court observed: 
 
Coverage [was] based on decades-old data and eradicated 
practices . . . . And voter registration and turnout numbers in 
the covered States have risen dramatically in the years since. 
Racial disparity in those numbers was compelling evidence 
justifying the preclearance remedy and the coverage formula. 
There is no longer such a disparity.168 
 
Thus, although Shelby County concerned the federalism costs 
of Section 5—which empowers greater federal oversight of local 
electoral control—the decision’s “rejection of past discrimination as 
a basis for congressional prophylactic measures certainly places 
Section 2 in the Supreme Court’s constitutional crosshairs.”169 And 
unlike Section 5, Section 2 is a permanent remedy in that it contains 
no sunset provision and does not itself require Congress to 
reconsider current conditions of voting discrimination.170 
Opponents of Section 2 could argue that the potential inability of 
Congress to identify enough modern examples of unconstitutional 
intentional voting discrimination shows that the results test 
exceeds the proper temporal scope of its Reconstruction 
Amendments enforcement power.171 
Next, Boerne also suggests that the geographic scope of an 
enforcement statute must be tailored to the constitutional harm. 
Concerning RFRA, the Court reasoned that the statute’s nationwide 
coverage was not justified by evidence of nationwide 
unconstitutional religious discrimination.172 The Court concluded 
that this broad geographic reach in part distinguished RFRA from 
 
 167. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 557. But see BERMAN, supra note 17, at 275 
(challenging the evidence that Chief Justice Roberts referenced during oral 
argument); Ho, supra note 63, at 813 (detailing the statistical unreliability of Chief 
Justice Roberts’ conclusions concerning improved voting equality). 
 168. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 551 (citations omitted). 
 169. Morgan, supra note 62, at 127–28; see also Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 
F.3d 1116, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that the lack 
of recent intentional voting discrimination calls into question Section 2’s compliance 
with Boerne). But see Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 333 (2d Cir. 2006) (Walker, J., 
concurring) (concluding that Section 2 “can serve to invalidate measures with 
disparate racial impact only if there is evidence in the congressional record that those 
measures are part of a history and practice of unconstitutional intentional 
discrimination” (emphasis added)). 
 170. See Morley, supra note 159, at 2085. 
 171. See, e.g., Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1122–23 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 172. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531–32. 
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other permissible exercises of Congress’ enforcement power.173 
Notably, Justice Kennedy’s opinion referenced Section 5 as an 
exemplar statute that is sufficiently geographically tailored, and 
contrasted it with RFRA’s “[s]weeping coverage,” which “ensures its 
intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and 
prohibiting official actions of almost every description and 
regardless of subject matter.”174 
In 2000, the Supreme Court reiterated the potential 
geographic limits on Congress’ remedial enforcement power in the 
United States v. Morrison decision.175 The Morrison Court held that 
Congress lacked the authority to enact portions of the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA), in relevant part because VAWA’s 
geographic scope lacked a congruent-and-proportional relationship 
to the Fourteenth Amendment harm of governmental gender 
discrimination.176 The Court went on to contrast VAWA with two 
1960s cases upholding the constitutionality of the VRA, Katzenbach 
v. Morgan177 and South Carolina v. Katzenbach,178 because the 
VRA’s protections were “directed only to the State where the evil 
found by Congress existed, [or] the remedy was directed only to 
those States in which Congress found that there had been 
discrimination.”179 The Court emphasized that the gender 
discrimination detailed in the VAWA legislative record was not 
state conduct, but even if it were, “[VAWA] is also different 
from . . . previously upheld remedies in that it applies uniformly 
throughout the Nation. Congress’ findings indicate that the 
problem of discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated 
crimes does not exist in all States, or even most States.”180  
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 532. 
 175. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 176. Id. at 626–27. Concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, the Morrison Court 
primarily held that although there was pervasive gender-based discrimination and 
gender-motivated crime across much of the country, this was merely private conduct 
beyond the reach of Congress’ enforcement power. Id. at 621–22. 
 177. 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (viewing the Section 5 enforcement clause as a one-
way ratchet that provides “a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress 
to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to 
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment”) (citing South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)). But cf. William Cohen, Congressional Power to 
Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 606 (1975) 
(critiquing Justice Brennan’s one-way “ratchet” theory of Congressional enforcement 
power). 
 178. 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966). 
 179. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (citation omitted). 
 180. Id. at 626. 
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Applied here, Section 2 may lack congruence and 
proportionality because its nationwide coverage purportedly also 
exceeds the scope of disenfranchisement, which mostly consisted 
(and some argue still consists)181 of localized efforts to suppress 
Black voters in the South.182 
In sum, the factors upon which the Boerne Court and its 
progeny have developed the “congruence and proportionality” test—
including the close examination of the remedial nature of a 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement statute and the nexus of the 
remedy to the temporal and geographic scope of the constitutional 
harm to be prevented—may not bode well for the future of Section 
2’s results test. As one commentator concluded: 
 
[T]he constitutional question framed by the Court in City of 
Boerne is a question of empirical judgment. This is now a 
subjective inquiry about how much racial discrimination exists 
in voting procedures and policies. The point was easy to make 
in 1965, as the record was replete with evidence of racial 
discrimination. It remains to be seen whether . . . the new 
conservative majority will look to the current state of affairs 
and make a similar conclusion.183 
 
c. Rebuttal to Boerne Arguments Against Section 2 
Even though lower court cases discussing Boerne’s effect on 
Section 2’s results test have so far upheld its constitutionality,184 
the future remains uncertain.185 Yet the uncertainty here should 
 
 181. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 88, at 88–92; Tolson, supra note 165, at 463. 
 182. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (applying Morrison and discussing the geographic scope 
problem for Section 2’s results test); CHARLES ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 938–39 (5th ed. 2012) (same); Morley, supra note 159, 
at 2085–86 (same). 
 183. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 136. 
 184. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 253 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (noting 
that “the constitutionality argument by the State is short sighted and ignores the 
history and text of the Fifteenth Amendment” because “both the Fifteenth 
Amendment and Section 2 . . . explicitly prohibit abridgement of the right to vote”); 
United States v. Blaine Cnty., 363 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2004) (vote dilution case 
upholding Section 2 after addressing the Boerne temporal and geographic scope 
arguments). But see Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1122–25 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that if the results test were to be applied to felony disenfranchisement laws, 
Section 2 may be unconstitutional under the Boerne framework); Hayden v. Pataki, 
449 F.3d 305, 330 (2d Cir. 2006) (Walker, J., concurring) (same). 
 185. As stated supra in note 32 and the accompanying text, the Supreme Court 
during October Term 2020 will potentially address the Boerne arguments against 
Section 2 in Brnovich v. DNC. For commentators discussing the potential Boerne-
related problems for Section 2, see, e.g., supra note 151. 
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not overshadow the strong arguments supporting the results test’s 
compliance with the Boerne framework. First, regarding the 
remedial nature of Section 2, a direct analogy to Boerne is likely 
weak given crucial differences between the two statutes and their 
related circumstances. The primary difference is that RFRA was a 
new statute created from whole cloth to legislatively restore an 
overruled interpretation of the First Amendment, whereas Section 
2’s results test arose from Congress’ explicit addition of the results-
oriented language to the long-existing VRA to correct what it saw 
as the Supreme Court’s misinterpretation of the statute.186 It stands 
to reason that Boerne represents an assertion of judicial supremacy 
over the Constitution, not the statutory standards of the VRA, where 
Congress has more room to supersede the Court’s interpretation of 
a statute to achieve legitimate remedial objectives.187  
Moreover, proponents of Section 2 have persuasively asserted 
that the scope of Congress’ authority in voting is broader than other 
areas because it enforces both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments,188 and accordingly, Congress should have more 
latitude to affix appropriate remedies.189 More leeway in combatting 
discriminatory voter suppression has a strong appeal given the 
fundamental nature of the right at stake190 and the potential 
 
 186. See Morley, supra note 159, at 2085. 
 187. See James Durling, May Congress Abrogate Stare Decisis by Statute?, 127 
YALE L.J.F. 27, 31 (2017); Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 131. 
 188.  United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 126–27 (1978) 
(holding that the VRA “is designed to implement the Fifteenth Amendment and, in 
some respects, the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 189. See Crum, supra note 151, at 1627 (making case for applying a “rationality 
standard” to Fifteenth Amendment enforcement statutes that “gives Congress far 
greater authority to interpret the Constitution and fashion remedial schemes”); Evan 
Tsen Lee, The Trouble with City of Boerne, and Why It Matters for the Fifteenth 
Amendment as Well, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 483, 502–03 (2012) (“When Congress acts 
pursuant to its Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers to combat 
such action, those enactments must be given the widest berth possible.”); see also 
Karlan, supra note 165, at 738 (arguing that “the Court should conclude that the risk 
that constitutionally innocuous conduct will be banned is outweighed by the 
difficulty of detecting and stopping serious constitutional injuries” to voting rights); 
Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 134 (making similar arguments); Morgan, supra 
note 62, at 165 (same); Nelson, supra note 63, at 637 (same). 
 190. In many contexts, the Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental 
nature of the right to vote. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) 
(describing the right to vote as a “fundamental political right”); Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a 
free and democratic society.”); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652–54 (1966) 
(quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370) (observing that the right to vote is “precious and 
fundamental” and “preservative of all rights”); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (“[T]he right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be 
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distortive effects of vote denial laws on the proper functioning of our 
democracy.191 With the exception of Shelby County, the Court has 
historically assented to this view in voting,192 and has generally 
acknowledged that Congress’ enforcement power is at its height 
when acting to protect a suspect class against discrimination or to 
safeguard a fundamental right.193 
Second, advocates have defended Section 2’s temporal 
tailoring by arguing that the statute “contains a kind of durational 
calibration that makes the enforcement congruent with the 
injury.”194 Although there is no sunset provision or reauthorization 
process for Section 2, the results test itself encompasses timing 
restraints that satisfy Boerne’s requirements. For example, Section 
2 does not itself impose a permanent ban or curtailment of any 
facially non-discriminatory election laws, such as voter photo-ID 
requirements.195 Rather, Section 2 merely “discontinues the use of 
an otherwise lawful electoral practice so long as it continues to 
 
so burdened or conditioned” on the ability to pay a tax.); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 
495, 512 (2000) (observing that the right to vote free of racial discrimination is a 
“fundamental principle” of the Constitution); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) 
(“[T]he right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source 
of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal 
dignity owed to each voter.”). 
 191. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105–10 (1980); Nelson, 
supra note 63, at 637 (“Because of the power of the vote in our democracy—because 
the right to vote secures all others—Congress has determined that discrimination 
may not infect voting or limit it on account of race, even if such discrimination is not 
purposeful.”); see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 
(1982) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)) 
(“[W]hen the State’s allocation of power places unusual burdens on the ability of 
racial groups to enact legislation specifically designed to overcome the ‘special 
condition’ of prejudice, the governmental action seriously ‘curtail[s] the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.’”).  
 192. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) (quoting Allen v. State 
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)) (observing that the VRA “should be 
interpreted in a manner that provides ‘the broadest possible scope’ in combating 
racial discrimination”); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980) 
(“[E]ven if § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination, the prior 
decisions of this Court foreclose any argument that Congress may not, pursuant to 
§ 2, outlaw voting practices that are discriminatory in effect.”); see also Daniel P. 
Tokaji, Intent and Its Alternatives: Defending the New Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 349, 370 (2006) (observing that VRA caselaw shows that “Congress may have 
greater latitude under the Fourteenth Amendment in protecting rights of 
participation, as compared with rights of representation”). 
 193. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530–34 (2004); Nevada Dep’t of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735–39 (2003). 
 194. Karlan, supra note 165, at 733; see also Morley, supra note 159, at 2081 
(“[T]he VRA will cease having any effect when voters no longer engage in racial bloc 
voting, meaning that members of all races have an equal opportunity to elect the 
candidates of their choice.”). 
 195. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301; see also Nelson, supra note 63, at 636–37. 
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result in vote denial or dilution on account of race.”196 If racial 
inequality in America improves and neutral voting requirements no 
longer interact with conditions of discrimination to harm minority 
voters more than White voters, then results test lawsuits will also 
wane and Section 2 will no longer be necessary to check local 
electoral control.197 
Additionally, the importance of the Northwest Austin and 
Shelby County decisions regarding the need for contemporary proof 
of intentional voting discrimination may also be overstated and 
distinguishable when evaluating Section 2 instead of Section 5.198 
To start with, Shelby County found that the VRA coverage formula 
was unconstitutional not based on the Boerne analysis, but instead 
on an “equal state sovereignty” doctrine that is entirely irrelevant 
to Section 2.199 The majority even justified its decision to nullify 
Section 5 by reassuring that Section 2 remained available to enforce 
the VRA.200 More generally, the Supreme Court has never applied 
the Boerne congruence and proportionality standard to voting rights 
 
 196. Nelson, supra note 63, at 637. 
 197. The Section 2 remedy “is in effect only temporary. Conditions external to the 
process of voting that presumably can be corrected provide the rationale for the 
remedy, and the remedy is no longer appropriate once those conditions cease to 
create a disparate impact.” Id. See also Karlan, supra note 165, at 741 (“Election 
practices are vulnerable to section 2 only if a jurisdiction’s politics is characterized 
by racial polarization. As the lingering effects of racial discrimination 
abate, . . . [excluded minorities’] ability and need to bring claims under section 2 will 
subside as well.”). 
 198. But even if Shelby County does not provide a reason to strike down the results 
test altogether, its suggestion that modern voting restrictions must be supported by 
recent violations may have bearing on what proof is required in Section 2 results 
litigation. See Tolson, supra note 165, at 452–53. But see Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. 
Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1017 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (detailing Arizona’s “long and 
unhappy history of official discrimination connected to voting” and evaluating 
historical context as far back as 1848); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 257 (5th Cir. 
2016) (en banc) (quoting Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 636) (“[I]n every redistricting cycle 
since 1970, Texas has been found to have violated the VRA with racially 
gerrymandered districts.”); N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 
218 (4th Cir. 2016) (considering similar history in the court’s disparate impact 
analysis, but concluding that the challenged law was enacted with discriminatory 
intent).  
 199. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556 (2013); see also Austin Graham, 
Unstable Footing: Shelby County’s Misapplication of the Equal Footing Doctrine, 23 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 301 (2014) (arguing the Shelby County court misapplied 
the equal state sovereignty doctrine); Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 
114 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2016) (same). 
 200. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 537 (“Both the Federal Government and individuals 
have sued to enforce § 2, and injunctive relief is available in appropriate cases to 
block voting laws from going into effect. Section 2 is permanent, applies nationwide, 
and is not at issue in this case.” (citations omitted)). 
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legislation enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment,201 which has 
numerous important textual, historical, and contextual differences 
compared to the Fourteenth Amendment.202 And although Boerne 
and its progeny have mostly contrasted violative statutes with 
Section 5, it also cannot be ignored that many Supreme Court 
decisions have repeatedly held up the VRA as a model of a 
congruent and proportional enforcement statute.203 Accordingly, 
the Boerne analysis and demand for a modern or widespread record 
of intentional discrimination may not even apply to voting rights 
legislation, and if it does, there are strong arguments for the Court 
to apply the tailoring requirement less stringently in this context. 
In short, Section 2 complies with any temporal tailoring 
requirement because built into the vote denial test is a durational 
limit: If the country improves such that there are “no episodes [of 
voter suppression] occurring in the past 40 years,” then vote denial 
results claims will no longer be viable.204 Regardless, it remains to 
be seen whether Boerne’s temporal limit will be imposed on voting 
rights legislation at all or in the same way as it has been applied to 
statutes in different antidiscrimination contexts that enforce only 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive rights. 
Third, the most direct argument against a Boerne challenge 
based on Section 2’s nationwide scope is simply that there are many 
historical and current examples of successful lawsuits confronting 
voting discrimination across the country, and areas imposing voting 
restrictions now are not necessarily the same as in 1965 or 1982. 
 
 201. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204–06 (2009); 
Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 546–47. 
 202. See generally Crum, supra note 151 (proposing a rational basis-like test for 
determining the permissible scope of Congressional enforcement powers under the 
Fifteenth Amendment); Tsen Lee, supra note 189 (making a similar argument). But 
see City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 213 n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (citing cases and claiming that the two enforcement clauses have always 
been treated as coextensive and that “it is not necessary to differentiate between the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment powers”). 
 203. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (“[M]easures 
protecting voting rights are within Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures place[] on the States.”); 
Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003) (upholding the FMLA and 
likening it to the VRA, which the Court described as a “valid exercise[] of Congress’ 
§ 5 power”); Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001) (“The 
ADA’s constitutional shortcomings are apparent when the Act is compared to 
Congress’ efforts in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to respond to a serious pattern of 
constitutional violations.”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (distinguishing the Patent Remedy Act from the 
VRA on account of the “undisputed record of racial discrimination confronting 
Congress in the voting rights cases”). 
 204. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530; see also Karlan, supra note 165, at 741. 
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For instance, North Dakota and Utah were not states subject to 
Section 5 preclearance or traditionally known for voter suppression, 
yet advocates in both states have recently used Section 2 litigation 
to successfully protect the rights of Native American voters.205 Such 
examples demonstrate that the nationwide coverage of Section 2 
makes it appropriately flexible to address voting discrimination 
whenever and wherever it may arise.  
That the Court has previously upheld nationwide voting 
protections against constitutional challenge without proof of 
nationwide need further supports this point. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 
for example, the Court upheld the VRA’s national ban on literacy 
tests, despite the lack of findings in the record that each state used 
a literacy test or imposed such a test to discriminate against 
minority voters.206 Congress came to the same conclusion in the 
1982 Senate Report, and asserted that “a certain amount of 
overinclusion is permissible” regarding the geographic coverage of 
an appropriate remedial statute.207 Moreover, it was precisely the 
unequal treatment of states that determined Shelby County’s 
effective negation of Section 5.208 For the Supreme Court to now 
hold that Section 2’s results test is unconstitutional because it does 
not distinguish between states would be an incongruous and 
illogical outcome. Overall, the modern voting discrimination 
 
 205. For North Dakota, see Brakebill v. Jaeger, No. 1:16-CV-008, 2016 WL 
7118548, at *3 (D.N.D. Aug. 1, 2016), stay granted, No. 18-1725, 2018 WL 4559487, 
at *3 (8th Cir. Sept. 24, 2018); Press Release, N.D. Sec’y of State, Agreement in 
Principle Related to Tribal IDs for Voting (Feb. 13, 2020), 
http://sos.nd.gov/files/uploaded_documents/tribal-ids-for-voting-joint-press-release-
20200213.pdf [https://perma.cc/65XK-NC53] (successful settlement of Section 2 
claims related to voter ID); Spirit Lake Tribe v. Benson Cnty., No. 2:10-CV-095, 2010 
WL 4226614, at *5 (D.N.D. Oct. 21, 2010) (successful Section 2 challenge to poll place 
closures). For Utah, see Navajo Nation v. San Juan Cnty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1346 
(D. Utah 2017) (granting summary judgment in favor of Navajo Nation on equal 
protection and Section 2 challenge to Utah redistricting plan), aff'd, 929 F.3d 1270 
(10th Cir. 2019); Navajo Nation Hum. Rts. Comm’n v. San Juan Cnty., 281 F. Supp. 
3d 1136, 1165 (D. Utah 2017) (denying summary judgment to the county on a Section 
2 challenge to the elimination of early in-person voting opportunities in the Navajo 
Nation); Press Release, ACLU of Utah, Settlement Announced in Navajo Nation 
Human Rights Commission v. San Juan County (Feb. 21, 2018), 
www.acluutah.org/images/18-02-21-ACLU_UT_Press_Release_NavajoVoting 
Rights-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9QY-9YQ8]. 
 206. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117, 133 (1970) (upholding Congress’ power 
to ban literacy tests nationwide, based in part on the voluminous record of 
“substantial, if not overwhelming” race-based discrimination in education). 
 207. Presto, supra note 145, at 627 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 42–43). 
 208. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (applying the equal 
sovereignty doctrine to strike down Section 4’s coverage formula of some but not all 
states). See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Schmitt, In Defense of Shelby County’s Principle of Equal 
State Sovereignty, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 209, 213 (2016). 
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problem demands an adaptable and incisive solution, and Section 
2’s broad reach makes it particularly fitting to forestall today’s voter 
suppression.209 
ii. Equal Protection Clause Challenge to Section 2 
In both recent and historical Section 2 cases, courts have 
consistently applied the results test using a totality of the 
circumstances analysis, not as a bare disparate impact standard.210 
But challengers to Section 2 have framed the statute as an overly 
race-conscious remedy that calls into doubt any election law with 
the smallest statistical racial disparity.211 In litigation, opponents 
of Section 2 have claimed that such an allegedly easy-to-prove 
standard requires election decisionmakers to think too much about 
race.212 Such race-consciousness purportedly offends the Roberts 
Court’s “colorblind” approach to ensuring access to political process, 
as expressed in several constitutional racial gerrymandering 
opinions.213  
To understand this equal protection challenge to the results 
test, it is helpful to return to first principles and summarize the 
development of the Court’s intent-favored approach to 
antidiscrimination laws in the 1976 Washington v. Davis case.214 
From this point of origin, the argument that Section 2 is in tension 
with the Equal Protection Clause can be viewed similarly to how 
 
 209. See Nelson, supra note 63, at 591 (listing “voter ID requirements, voter 
purges, restricted voting periods, stringent voter registration regulations, and 
felon[y] disfranchisement, among other voting rights encumbrances”). 
 210. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 277 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Ne. 
Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 628 (6th Cir. 2016); Feldman 
v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Off., 843 F.3d 366, 379 (9th Cir. 2016); Lee v. Va. State Bd. 
of Elections, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016); Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. 
Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 211. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 152 (“[C]ritics now consider section 2 
to be an all-purpose anti-discrimination provision, no different from much derided 
affirmative action plans.”); Johnson, supra note 66, at 2 (“Even though Shelby 
County rejected federal oversight of state elections through Section 5, a conscious 
effort has been made on several fronts to resurrect federal supremacy over state 
control of elections under Section 2 . . . . [T]hese efforts attempt to import bare 
statistical tests for liability that were previously utilized under Section 5 . . . .”). 
 212. For briefs raising equal protection constitutional claims against Section 2, 
see supra notes 32, 67. 
 213. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 149–51 (discussing the conflict 
between the colorblind reading of the Constitution and purpose to protect “discrete 
and insular minorities” in the context of election law). See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 
556 U.S. 1 (2009); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 214. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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the Court had applied the reasoning from Davis to narrow the 
statutory disparate impact tests in the housing215 and 
employment216 antidiscrimination context.  
In short, the argument that Section 2 violates the Equal 
Protection Clause relies on two critiques: (1) Section 2’s results test 
is nothing more than a race-conscious disparate impact standard; 
and (2) remedial race-conscious voting protections are the 
equivalent of racial discrimination, and implicate the same zero-
sum game of supposed competition between racial groups as seen in 
the allocation of employment and housing resources in the Title VII 
and Fair Housing Act contexts. As described below, however, the 
Supreme Court should reject both critiques; where other 
antidiscrimination statutes may affront the Roberts Court’s 
colorblind reading of the Constitution, the Section 2 vote denial 
results test does not pose the same issues. As the Supreme Court 
itself has recognized, “States enjoy leeway to take race-based 
actions reasonably judged necessary under a proper interpretation 
of the VRA.”217 
a. Disfavored Disparate Impact Jurisprudence 
In 1970, Black police officers challenged the alleged 
discriminatory hiring practice of the D.C. Police Department––a 
lawsuit that would forever change the legal landscape of 
antidiscrimination law.218 The plaintiff officers opposed the 
Department’s use of an aptitude test that they said had no 
relationship to job performance, but disproportionately screened out 
Black candidates.219 In a 1976 Justice White opinion, the Supreme 
Court ushered in a new era of Equal Protection Clause 
jurisprudence by holding that laws with a racial disparate impact, 
“standing alone and without regard to whether it indicated a 
discriminatory purpose,” do not violate the Constitution.220 To 
downplay the significance of its holding, the Court portrayed the 
new intent rule as fitting squarely in a longstanding history of the 
Court preferring an intent-based approach to combat 
 
 215. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 
U.S. 519, 543–44 (2015). 
 216. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595–96 (2009). 
 217.  Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1472 (2017). 
 218. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 229. 
 219. Id. at 235; see also Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of 
Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 548 n.56 (1977) (noting that the 
plaintiffs in Washington v. Davis “made no claim of intentional or purposeful racial 
discrimination; they relied solely on disproportionate impact”). 
 220. Davis, 426 U.S. at 237. 
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discrimination, but that history is much more equivocal than the 
Court led on.221 Justice White also attempted to soften the edges of 
the new rule by asserting that lower courts should take a seemingly 
pragmatic222 and flexible approach by aggregating results-based 
evidence to circumstantially prove intent, but subsequent decisions 
have mostly hardened around an intent standard that has 
minimized the importance of discriminatory results.223 
Tellingly, the Davis Court expressed an awareness that almost 
all laws are more burdensome on minority groups, and an 
apprehension of a results-based cause of action that had the 
 
 221. Compare Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340–42 (1960) (holding that 
the “essential inevitable effect” of redefining a city’s boundaries to remove Black 
voters violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments), Palmer v. Thompson, 
403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971) (using an effects test to uphold discriminatory public 
pool closures because the closure “shows no state action affecting blacks differently 
from whites” and “no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate 
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it”), and 
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972) (“[W]e have focused 
upon the effect—not the purpose or motivation—of a school board’s action in 
determining whether it is a permissible method of dismantling a dual system. The 
existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an 
impermissible effect.”), with Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1945) (holding 
that to prove an equal protection violation, “[a] purpose to discriminate must be 
present” and “may be proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the 
proscribed race or by unequal application of the law to such an extent as to show 
intentional discrimination”), Griffin v. Prince Edward Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 
234 (1964) (rejecting the official closure of public schools to avoid desegregation after 
finding the state was motivated by “massive resistance” to desegregation efforts), 
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56 (1964) (rejecting an equal protection vote 
dilution claim because plaintiffs failed to prove the legislature was “motivated by 
racial considerations or in fact drew the districts on racial lines”), and Keyes v. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205 (1973) (ruling that “a current condition of segregation 
resulting from intentional state action” is an essential element of plaintiff’s 
desegregation claim). See generally Perry, supra note 219, at 544–48. 
 222. See Allan Ides, The Jurisprudence of Justice Byron White, 103 YALE L.J. 419, 
456 (1993) (arguing that Justice White’s jurisprudence reflects “realism rooted in the 
belief that law should reflect a pragmatic appraisal” of the facts). 
 223. See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (ruling that 
discriminatory intent cannot be proven by the mere awareness of a decisionmaker 
that a disparate impact would result from its action); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 
279, 298–99 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of capital punishment despite an 
overwhelming statistical disparity involving race and capital sentencing); Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 330 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The 
University’s professed good intentions cannot excuse its outright racial 
discrimination any more than such intentions justified the now denounced 
arguments of slaveholders and segregationists.”). Cf. Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–68 (1977) (reaffirming that “official action will 
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate 
impact” but enumerating circumstantial factors permissible to show prima facie 
discriminatory intent, including evidence of disparate impact as a “starting point”); 
Id. at 270 n.21 (adopting the Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), defense that 
the state may “establish . . . that the same decision would have resulted even had 
the impermissible purpose not been considered”). 
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potential to disrupt any number of regulatory schemes.224 That 
same apprehension has endured, and is evidenced by an equal 
protection election law standard that prioritizes the states’ 
interests225 and the Roberts Court’s overall adoption of an intent-
favored ethos in other contexts.226 While the Davis opinion left open 
“the choice whether to impose [statutory] disparate impact 
standards to legislators,”227 the reality is that existing 
antidiscrimination statutes are being subjected to a similar intent-
based narrowing.228 
The contracting of statutory disparate impact tests has 
occurred most prominently in the Title VII and Fair Housing Act 
contexts, but is not exclusive to those statutes.229 Title VII is the 
centerpiece of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and uses a disparate 
impact test to prohibit discrimination in employment decisions 
 
 224. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248; see also id. at 248 n.14 (“[D]isproportionate-impact 
analysis might invalidate ‘tests and qualifications for voting, draft deferment, public 
employment, jury service, . . . (s)ales taxes, bail schedules, utility rates, bridge tolls, 
license fees, and other state-imposed charges.’ It has also been argued that minimum 
wage and usury laws as well as professional licensing requirements would require 
major modifications in light of the unequal-impact rule.”); Stephanopoulos, supra 
note 34, at 1612 (noting that “[d]isparate impacts are ubiquitous”); see also 
ABERNATHY, supra note 182, at 124 (contemplating whether widespread disparate 
impacts on minority voters should be a reason to have a results-oriented standard). 
 225. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190–91 (2008); 
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (ruling that the degree of scrutiny on 
state election law decisions depends on the extent the challenged practice burdens 
voting rights); see also HASEN, supra note 49, at 40 (aptly describing the equal 
protection voting burden analysis as “an awful double standard”).  
 226. See Nelson, supra note 63, at 605 (observing that since the 1982 Section 2 
Amendments, “the Supreme Court’s receptivity toward evidence of disparate impact” 
has experienced “a precipitous decline”). See generally Reva B. Siegel, Race-
Conscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts 
Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653 (2015) (overviewing the tensions in Roberts Court 
disparate impact jurisprudence). 
 227. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (stating the “extension of the 
rule beyond those areas where it is already applicable by reason of statute, such as 
in the field of public employment, should await legislative prescription”). 
 228. See Primus, supra note 136, at 585 (“The rise of individualist, colorblind 
values in the generation since Davis now makes it necessary to consider a third issue: 
the affirmative tension between equal protection and disparate impact statutes.”); 
see also Nelson, supra note 63, at 584 (discussing the same tension); Stephanopoulos, 
supra note 34, at 1595 (same). 
 229. See, e.g., Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1787 
n.4 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (generally deriding disparate impact liability as 
relying on a “simplistic and often faulty assumption that ‘some one particular factor 
is the key or dominant factor behind differences in outcomes’ and that one should 
expect ‘an even or random distribution of outcomes . . . in the absence of such 
complicating causes as genes or discrimination’”); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 
275, 280–81 (2001) (permitting only intent claims—not disparate impact claims—
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
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based on race or other protected characteristics.230 The test came 
under scrutiny in 2009 in Ricci v. DeStefano.231 In that case, White 
firefighters in New Haven challenged the municipality’s decision to 
abandon a promotions exam that would likely result in minority 
employees being rejected at a disproportionately higher rate.232 
New Haven claimed it discarded the exam because of Title VII 
disparate impact liability concerns.233 In a 5–4 decision, Justice 
Kennedy ruled that New Haven violated Title VII’s prohibition of 
disparate treatment of the White firefighters because the City 
lacked a “strong basis in evidence” that keeping the exam would 
result in disparate impact liability favoring the Black 
firefighters.234 In so ruling, the Ricci Court heightened the burden 
on regulated entities seeking to prevent a discriminatory disparate 
impact violation pre-litigation, reasoning that even the risk of “a 
significant statistical disparity,” without something more, would be 
insufficient to comply with Title VII.235 
Justice Scalia also wrote a blistering concurrence, warning of 
a coming “war” between disparate impact and the Court’s equal 
protection doctrine.236 Justice Scalia criticized that “disparate-
impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring 
employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies.”237 
Despite Scalia’s more direct confrontation of the potential 
constitutional issue posed by results tests, the risk to Title VII 
seems to have briefly subsided.238 But the Ricci opinions surfaced 
the Court’s overall unease about statutory disparate impact tests.239 
 
 230. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2), 2000e-2(l); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 231. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009). 
 232. Id. at 562. 
 233. Id. at 563. 
 234. Id. at 593. 
 235. Id. at 587. 
 236. See id. at 594–96 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 237. Id. at 594; see also Morgan, supra note 62, at 109 (noting that Justice Scalia’s 
Ricci concurrence views the government as “effectively classifying citizens on the 
basis of race and making assumptions about individuals in those groups”); Clegg, 
supra note 66, at 40 (claiming that the tension “between the anti-race-conscious 
mandate of prohibiting disparate treatment and the race-conscious mandate of 
prohibiting disparate impact . . . is so strong that disparate impact statutes may 
violate the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee”). 
 238. Just one year after Ricci, Justice Scalia authored a unanimous opinion 
applying Title VII’s disparate impact test and explicitly did not challenge the 
statute’s constitutionality. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 216 (2010). 
 239. Nelson, supra note 63, at 609 n.156 (observing that eliminating the “good 
faith” defense used by employers to conform with Title VII makes pre-litigation 
voluntary compliance more difficult). 
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For the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Roberts Court in 2015 
again showed apprehension about the future of statutory disparate 
impact tests in Texas Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities.240 There, the Court warned of 
potential constitutional problems if the housing disparate impact 
standard functioned to encourage race-conscious remedies or 
numerical quotas.241 The case concerned Texas’ method of allocating 
low-income housing tax credits in Dallas, where the housing 
authority had allegedly granted most credits to developments in 
low-income neighborhoods and denied them to developments within 
suburban (and predominantly White) areas.242 This caused a 
disparate impact on minority residents because it perpetuated 
racial segregation by concentrating government housing in only 
certain low-income neighborhoods, in violation of the FHA.243  
The Inclusive Communities Court upheld the FHA disparate 
impact test, but Justice Kennedy warned that difficult questions 
“might arise if disparate-impact liability under the FHA caused 
race to be used and considered in a pervasive and explicit 
manner . . . [that] tend[s] to perpetuate race-based considerations 
rather than move beyond them.”244 To remain constitutional, 
Justice Kennedy continued, the FHA disparate impact test must be 
applied in a way that avoids “inject[ing] racial considerations into 
every housing decision.”245 Yet the Court made sure to clarify that 
its unease with the FHA’s test “does not impugn housing 
authorities’ race-neutral efforts to encourage revitalization of 
communities that have long suffered the harsh consequences of 
segregated housing.”246 Thus, the final message in Inclusive 
Communities was clear, if not instructive: Housing officials “may 
choose to foster diversity and combat racial isolation with race-
neutral tools” having some awareness of race, but not too much.247 
The Inclusive Communities and Ricci decisions revealed that 
the Roberts Court views statutory disparate impact tests as 
 
 240. 576 U.S. 519, 543–44 (2015). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 526. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 543. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 545. 
 247. Id. (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation in Equal 
Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1131–33 
(2016) (describing the undefined line in the Inclusive Communities Court’s opinion). 
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constitutional only given the appropriate set of safeguards and 
circumstances. And importantly, these cases appear to reinforce the 
Davis Court’s view that intent-based methods are best for rooting 
out discrimination. Under these circumstances, Justice Scalia’s 
warning of a coming “war between disparate impact and equal 
protection”248 may have its next major battle play out in the 
Supreme Court over the Section 2 results test.249 
b. Applying the Equal Protection Arguments to Section 2 
The importance of Ricci and Inclusive Communities on the 
future of Section 2 depends on the degree to which the Supreme 
Court adheres to two main Equal Protection Clause critiques: (1) 
the two-part results test is essentially a one-part disparate impact 
analysis that is too easy to prove;250 and (2) remedial race-conscious 
voting remedies are the equivalent of racial discrimination, 
implicating what is perceived as the same zero-sum competition for 
finite resources between racial groups as in the employment and 
housing contexts.251 On this second point, opponents of Section 2 
 
 248. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
Siegel, supra note 226, at 667. 
 249. For scholars discussing constitutional risk to Section 2’s two-part results test, 
see, e.g., Ho, supra note 63, at 824; Nelson, supra note 63, at 635; Tokaji, supra note 
62, at 489; Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 70, at 127. For a discussion of the equal 
protection arguments raised in Section 2 cases, see supra notes 30–32, 66–68. 
 250. See Clegg & von Spakovsky, supra note 66, at 4 (narrowly construing Section 
2); Johnson, supra note 66, at 1–3 (“Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires much 
more than bare statistical disparities; it requires a searching inquiry into the real-
world impact of a particular law on the opportunity of minority voters to cast a ballot, 
as viewed within the entire landscape of electoral opportunities.”); Adams, supra 
note 66, at 308 (“If Section 2 were applied to cases where a statistical disparity drove 
a liability finding, absent causality and supported by a broad non-qualitative 
package of evidence, then that version of Section 2 may well face serious 
constitutional challenges . . . .”). 
 251. See Nelson, supra note 63, at 608–09 (“Implicit in the Ricci decision is the 
notion that remedial race consciousness is the equivalent of racial 
discrimination . . . . [C]hoosing a policy or practice with a less discriminatory impact 
on minorities is intentionally discriminatory toward another population. This false 
equivalence forms the premise of the Court’s determination that preventive race-
conscious measures are almost always illegal.”); Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving 
Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 2163 (2013) (“Ricci means that 
disparate-impact liability is vulnerable to constitutional  
attack . . . . Ricci characterizes a decision to abandon a promotional practice because 
of the race of successful candidates as a form of racial discrimination, meaning that 
disparate-impact liability, triggered as it is by the race of successful candidates, is a 
type of racial classification subject to strict scrutiny . . . [or] ‘strict in theory and fatal 
in fact.’”); Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum 
Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 202 (2010) (“A post-racial 
discomfort with noticing and acting upon race supports such a zero-sum 
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may seek to draw on the Court’s constitutional racial 
gerrymandering jurisprudence, which prohibits race considerations 
from “predomina[ting]” over other factors in the drawing of electoral 
district lines.252 If the Court accepts these premises, the reasoning 
from Ricci and Inclusive Communities could present problems for 
the Section 2 vote denial results test. 
First, opponents of Section 2 assert that the results test has 
been construed to conceal what is really a bare disparate impact 
test.253 Under this theory, the Senate Factors that guide a probing 
totality of the circumstances analysis of the discriminatory 
conditions giving rise to the burden on minority voters are only 
window dressing, and if voting rights plaintiffs can show that an 
election law causes a racial statistical disparity, they win.254 As 
such, the results test purportedly employs a “de minimis statistical 
standard” for finding a Section 2 violation, meaning that plaintiffs 
will prevail too easily and overly disrupt local administration of 
elections.255 Some have gone so far as to claim that the results test 
in essence has covertly resurrected the more stringent Section 5 
retrogression standard.256 
Indeed, even Section 2 advocates have cautioned that the 
prevailing two-part vote denial test should not devolve into a one-
part disparate impact showing.257 As these commentators have 
warned, the results test applied to vote denial laws may be even 
more constitutionally problematic than other antidiscrimination 
disparate impact statutes because Section 2 does not follow a 
burden-shifting framework, which deprives jurisdictions of the 
 
understanding of equality: if race no longer matters, a decision maker’s concern for 
the disparities experienced by members of one racial group (‘empathy’) inevitably 
includes the intent to discriminate against others (‘prejudice’).”); Siegel, supra note 
226, at 687 (discussing zero-sum conceptions in the Roberts Court’s opinions). 
 252. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009); League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); 
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 253. Johnson, supra note 66, at 11–13. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 13. 
 256. Id. at 11–13 (arguing that Section 2 litigants have encouraged courts to “graft 
Section 5 retrogression principles onto Section 2”); Adams, supra note 66, at 318 
(criticizing the alleged conversion of Section 2 disparate impact into Section 5 
retrogression); see also supra note 119 for the definition of retrogression. 
 257. See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, supra note 34, at 1590 (arguing that a mere 
statistical test is problematic because it “is too easy to satisfy” and noting that 
“[m]any aspects of states’ electoral systems cause racial disparities, and almost all 
of them are suspect under the test”). 
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opportunity to justify racial disparities past the prima facie stage of 
litigation.258 
Second, Ricci and Inclusive Communities both suggest that 
compelling states to prioritize avoiding a racial disparate impact is 
intrinsically undesirable, and violates the Equal Protection 
Clause’s demand of race-neutrality.259 Applied to Section 2, the 
anticipation of results test liability could theoretically incentivize 
lawmakers to avoid statistical disparities by overly scrutinizing the 
racial effects of every proposed voting law or policy in advance.260 
This incentive could put jurisdictions between a rock and a hard 
place of litigation.261 The argument would be that, like the city of 
New Haven choosing to reject its promotion exam in fear of Title VII 
liability in Ricci, jurisdictions apprehensive of Section 2 liability 
because of potential racial disparities would be forced to abandon 
an otherwise justified electoral regulation. But by choosing the 
Section 2 liability-avoidance route that favors protecting minority 
voters—even in situations presenting a significant statistical 
disparity and strong indication that enacting the law would violate 
Section 2262—the jurisdiction could also be subjected to equal 
protection liability for elevating race over other factors in election 
administration. This perceived incentive for jurisdictions to be more 
race-conscious in making election management decisions offends 




 258. Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 66, at 5–7. 
 259. See Tex. Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 
U.S. 519, 543–46 (2015); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009). 
 260. Nelson, supra note 63, at 585–86 (“Ricci’s holding that evidence of statistical 
disparity is not ‘a strong basis in evidence’ to advance a claim of employment 
discrimination . . . potentially informs Section 2’s vote denial jurisprudence.”). 
 261. See, e.g., Morley, supra note 159, at 2086 (citing Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 
1455, 1469, 1472 (2017)) (“In attempting to enforce Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection rights, section 2 might compel considerations of race that run afoul of 
them.”); Mark Rush, The Current State of Election Law in the United States, 23 
WASH. & LEE J. C. R. & SOC. JUST. 383, 393 (2017) (citing Ala. Legis. Black Caucus 
v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273–74 (2015)) (summarizing that “states must avoid 
the ‘trap’ that the case law sets if states are unable to navigate between the Scylla 
of Section 2 of the VRA and the Charybdis of the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 262. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 584 (declining to hold “that meeting the strong-basis-
in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in a future case”); cf. 
Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1274 (citing Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585, and setting 
the standard that legislators “may have a strong basis in evidence to use racial 
classifications in order to comply with a statute when they have good reasons to 
believe such use is required, even if a court does not find that the actions were 
necessary for statutory compliance”). 
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[W]hen the government acts based on the racial outcomes of its 
programs or policies, the government is effectively classifying 
citizens on the basis of race and making assumptions about 
individuals in those groups in a process that facilitates and 
encourages essentialization of minority and non-minority 
citizens alike and therefore presents an affront to the dignity of 
the individual.263 
 
Third, the argument against race-consciousness in regulating 
elections also relies on a zero-sum understanding of government 
resource allocation. Opponents of disparate impact tests assume 
that antidiscrimination laws purportedly create competition 
between racial groups.264 Under this framing, the Roberts Court has 
at times viewed preventative or remedial measures to abate racial 
disparate impacts as direct causes of injury to non-minority groups, 
in violation of Equal Protection.265 As Justice Scalia warned in Ricci 
concerning Title VII, “disparate-impact provisions place a racial 
thumb on the scales,” in favor of minority groups and in purported 
detriment to non-minority applicants.266 
A similar zero-sum understanding could be applicable in the 
vote dilution context, where the Title VII analogy is said to be 
relevant because legislators also have a finite amount of districts by 
which to divide the state.267 Along these lines, the Court has 
cautioned that if the VRA unjustifiably compels legislators to have 
race “predominate” in redistricting choices, race-neutral interests 
are unlawfully “subordinated.”268 In other words, employment or 
redistricting decisionmakers can be viewed as choosing between two 
racial groups pitted against each other to split the pie of a finite 
 
 263. Morgan, supra note 62, at 109 (footnotes omitted) (citing Ricci, 557 U.S. at 
584). 
 264. See Nelson, supra note 63, at 608–09 (summarizing these arguments); Siegel, 
supra note 226, at 687 (summarizing the same arguments). 
 265. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2237 (2016) (observing 
that race-consciousness is a “highly suspect tool”); Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579–80 
(“Whatever the City’s ultimate aim—however well intentioned or benevolent it might 
have seemed—the City made its employment decision because of race.”). 
 266. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 267. Nelson, supra note 63, at 611 (“In the context of redistricting, like 
employment, the potential zero-sum calculation predominates . . . . For example, 
drawing voters into one district versus another may potentially impact the 
electability of one group’s preferred candidate versus another group’s.”). 
 268. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“[A] plaintiff must prove 
that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting 
principles . . . to racial considerations.”); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the 
Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1569, 1573–94 (2002) (collecting cases and discussing the 
subordination issue). 
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resource: If a minority candidate gets the job or a racially polarized 
state draws a Section 2 majority-minority electoral district, then the 
White candidate is not hired, or the state overlooks districting 
principles that could benefit non-minority voters. The ostensible 
conflict is that anticipating results test liability makes lawmakers 
unfairly put additional resources in favor of minority voters’ 
interests.269 The many weaknesses of this argument related to vote 
dilution are beyond the scope of this Article,270 but as discussed 
below, the Ricci analogy that favoring one race inextricably harms 
another is particularly unfounded in the vote denial context. 
The reasoning from Inclusive Communities is perhaps more 
relevant to vote denial because, unlike employment decisions, FHA 
funding does not necessarily present the same zero-sum dynamic. 
Instead, both the FHA and Section 2 vote denial cases can be 
reframed as concerning enlarge-the-pie objectives because creating 
more affordable housing and additional opportunities to register 
and vote could benefit everyone, not just minority groups.271 But 
issues related to zero-sum framing may still present problems for 
the vote denial results test.272 In Inclusive Communities, the Court 
warned of rigidity in housing choices as a response to disparate 
impact liability concerns.273 For Justice Kennedy, the FHA does not 
promote one vision of affordable housing development, and results 
liability should not be used to elevate a minority groups’ interests 
over other considerations.274 Doing so may chill the innovation and 
 
 269. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1469–72 (2017) (examining the 
tension in the vote dilution context between Section 2 and the Equal Protection racial 
gerrymandering jurisprudence). But see Hinds Cnty. Republican Party v. Hinds 
Cnty., 432 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (rejecting a group of White voter’s 
Section 2 vote dilution claim). 
 270. For a discussion of these arguments, see generally Dale Ho, Minority Vote 
Dilution in the Age of Obama, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1041 (2013); Morley, supra note 
159. 
 271. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 34, at 1609 (“[W]ith a nonrivalrous good like 
voting, there is no risk of such collateral damage. A ruling that makes it easier for 
minority citizens to vote does not impede nonminority citizens from casting ballots. 
In fact, it helps them to vote, thus yielding innocent beneficiaries rather than 
victims—a dynamic that could plausibly induce courts to err on the side of liability 
in section 2 litigation.”). 
 272. See Tex. Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 
U.S. 519, 539–40 (2015) (discussing issues with focusing on only statistical 
disparities). 
 273. Id. at 540 (“The FHA is not an instrument to force housing authorities to 
reorder their priorities. Rather, the FHA aims to ensure that those priorities can be 
achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating 
segregation.”). 
 274. See id. at 541–42 (discussing other considerations that “housing authorities 
and private developers” must take into account). 
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flexibility necessary to improve and distribute housing options in 
the “vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise system.”275 According to 
the Court, local housing authorities may legitimately (and 
permissively) “choose to foster diversity . . . and mere awareness of 
race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not 
doom that endeavor at the outset.”276 But the Court imposed a 
limitation on this principle, stating that diversity-fostering 
objectives may not be sought in a way that encourages the adoption 
of numerical racial quotas or makes race the overriding 
consideration.277 
Section 2 applied to vote denial could be misconstrued to 
operate similarly. If the risk of Section 2 results test liability 
incentivizes lawmakers to overly structure their election rules to 
foster access for minority groups, opponents of Section 2 would 
argue that the results test is stunting innovation in electoral 
management and unconstitutionally subordinates other non-racial 
interests (like the common refrain of preventing voter fraud).278 
Even if such race-consciousness imposes no concrete injury on other 
voters—based on race or otherwise in a so-called “visible-victims” 
theory279—challengers of Section 2 may still claim that simply 
having race-neutral interests “subjected to a discriminatory 
competitive process is a legally cognizable injury.”280 
In sum, opponents of Section 2 argue that the results test is on 
a collision course with the Equal Protection Clause281 because it 
 
 275. Id. at 533. 
 276. Id. at 545. 
 277. Id. at 542 (warning that “serious constitutional concerns” arise if states are 
encouraged to adopt racial quotas). 
 278. For detailed analyses of the myth of widespread voter fraud, see sources cited 
supra note 49. 
 279. See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 36 (1976) (“The voting test suspension remedies have been 
relatively uncontroversial because they do not frustrate the legitimate expectations 
of third parties or prefer the intended beneficiaries to others similarly 
situated . . . .”); Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 1341, 1381 (2010) (noting that VRA remedies generally do not create visible 
victims); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging 
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1346–48 (2011). 
 280. See Rosenthal, supra note 251, at 2200 (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 718–19 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244, 260–62 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 211 
(1995)). 
 281. See Clegg, supra note 66, at 40 (citing Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594–
96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (arguing there is a tension “between the anti-race-
conscious mandate of prohibiting disparate treatment and the race-conscious 
mandate of prohibiting disparate impact . . . so strong that disparate impact statutes 
may violate the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee”). 
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purportedly (1) is too easy to prove by a bare statistical disparate 
impact on minority voters, and (2) encourages too much race-
consciousness in election management at the perceived cost to non-
minority voters and race-neutral interests. 
 
c. Rebuttal to the Equal Protection Arguments Against 
Section 2 
The Supreme Court should reject the Equal Protection Clause 
arguments against Section 2 in the vote denial context. Addressing 
the first critique, advocates are wise to reinforce that the results 
test promulgates a totality of the circumstances analysis, not a bare 
disparate impact standard. Although certain aspects of the vote 
denial results test are still forming, all circuit courts have agreed 
that the two-part framework requires proving much more than a 
statistical disparity to establish a violation.282 In other words, 
evidence of a disparate impact on minority voters is necessary, but 
not sufficient, to strike down an election law for its discriminatory 
effects.283 Arguments against the results test have largely ignored 
the second part of the analysis that requires Section 2 plaintiffs to 
prove a causal nexus to conditions of discrimination using the 
Senate Factors. This burden on plaintiffs to link the identified 
disparate impact to conditions of discrimination and the 
jurisdiction’s lack of a legitimate, race-neutral justification provides 
a liability-limiting function for Section 2,284 and the totality of the 
circumstances inquiry is perhaps even more cabining of the vote 
denial test than the vote dilution test.285 
Further, Section 2 advocates are well-positioned to disprove 
that the results test has actually superimposed the Section 5 
 
 282. “Section 2 rejects reliance on ‘[a]n inflexible rule,’” Ellen D. Katz, Section 2 
After Section 5: Voting Rights and the Race to the Bottom, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1961, 1970 (2018) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994)), and 
Section 2 requires “a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality, 
and on a functional view of the political process.” Katz, supra (citing Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986)). See also Stephanopoulos, supra note 34, at 1569. 
 283. Ho, supra note 63, at 822. 
 284. Id. (emphasizing the second prong analyzing the Senate Factors as a key 
aspect of the Section 2 vote denial test). 
 285. See Ellen Katz, Margaret Aisenbrey, Anna Baldwin & Emma 
Cheuse, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982 Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, 
University of Michigan Law School, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 660 (2006) 
(finding that of sixty-eight lawsuits satisfying the Gingles preconditions, “courts 
engaged in only a perfunctory review of the Senate Factors,” and only eleven 
decisions ruled against plaintiffs at this second step). 
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retrogression standard that Shelby County effectively nullified. The 
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that “[r]etrogression is not 
the inquiry in [Section] 2 dilution cases.”286 And unlike Section 5 
retrogression, which analyzes a voting changes’ effect on access for 
minority voters as compared to the status quo ante, inherent in 
Section 2’s language is a comparison of a voting law’s effects between 
minority and nonminority groups.287 The two tests applied to vote 
denial laws ask fundamentally different questions and claims that 
the Section 2 test has somehow stealth-revived the Section 5 
retrogression standard are entirely meritless.288 
More fundamentally, Section 2’s results-based and totality-
focused analysis is the best way to protect against even subtle forms 
of unconstitutional voting discrimination and should be preferred 
to a standard built on intent. Focusing on unjustified disparate 
impacts in election laws can “smoke out”289 prejudicial intent 
without the smoking gun evidence rarely available in modern 
discrimination cases.290 Intent-based tests also have practical 
barriers to their effectiveness, which could be avoided by a results 
standard.291 First, there are substantial obstacles to ascertaining 
and aggregating the intent of the legislative body that enacted an 
election law.292 Second, judges may face interpersonal disincentives 
 
 286. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 884 (1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a); S. REP. 
NO. 97-417, at 68 n.224). 
 287. See Katz, supra note 282, at 1976–80 (discussing cases denying and allowing 
the use of retrogression); Muller, supra note 57, at 469–70 (comparing Section 2 and 
Section 5); Tokaji, supra note 62, at 456 (same). 
 288. See Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 551–56 (6th Cir. 
2014) (rejecting Ohio’s argument that the Section 2 test improperly adopts Section 
5’s retrogression analysis, considering the Section 2 “benchmark” is not past practice, 
but instead is the minority group’s status “compared to other groups of voters”); 
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. N.C., 769 F.3d 224, 241–42 (2014) (rejecting the 
retrogression argument). 
 289. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 236 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (finding that “neutral 
reasons can and do mask racial intent” and disparate impact tests can help smoke 
out discriminatory intent in voting).   
 290. Lang & Hebert, supra note 36, at 780; Primus, supra note 279, at 1376; 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 34, at 1605. 
 291. See Tolson, supra note 165, at 447–48 n.65 (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 
613, 629 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)) (finding that the “problems with the 
discriminatory intent standard—i.e., adducing the amount/kind of evidence 
sufficient to prove a violation—continued to confound plaintiffs and scholars”). 
 292. Regarding older laws, an intent test is “hopelessly ineffective” because 
legislative histories are not maintained in many jurisdictions and “those who enacted 
ancient voting requirements could not be subpoenaed from their graves.” United 
States v. Blaine Cnty., 363 F.3d 897, 908 (9th Cir. 2004). Present-day legislators are 
also often “protected from testifying about their motives by legislative immunity.” 
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to finding intent from circumstantial factors. After all, a finding of 
discriminatory intent inevitably puts judges in the challenging 
position of essentially labeling their fellow public servants as racist, 
often without direct proof.293 Therefore, an intent test for voting 
discrimination could contradictorily foster the type of problematic 
racial divisiveness that the Supreme Court labors to avoid,294 while 
a disparate impact-based standard best serves the important 
Reconstruction Amendment objective to eliminate discrimination in 
voting.295 
Turning to the second Section 2 results test critique that is 
based on arguments raised in Ricci and Inclusive Communities, the 
Supreme Court cannot ignore crucial distinctions between 
antidiscrimination efforts in voting compared to employment or 
housing. Primarily, the vote denial context does not present a zero-
sum game of racial groups competing for a scarcity of resources. 
Invalidating discriminatory voting burdens “will not visit negative 
consequences on any racial group. Unlike in the employment 
context, . . . the right to vote can be extended to countless 
individuals without denying others access to that right.”296 
 
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 36–37); see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 
45 (1998) (discussing legislative immunity). Even if the intent of a legislator can be 
determined, the issue is compounded if intent must be proved as to the enacting 
governing body as a whole. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 
(1999) (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 
(1977)) (“The task of assessing a jurisdiction’s motivation, however, is not a simple 
matter; on the contrary, it is an inherently complex endeavor . . . .”); ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 16–18 (1997) 
(arguing against statutory intentionalism, Scalia recognized the impossibility of 
determining the single, motivating intent of a legislature). Without clear public 
statements of motivation, advocates often cannot prove an intent claim without 
relying mostly on circumstantial factors and the law’s disparate impact, which alone 
is typically insufficient to make a prima facie case. See, e.g., NAACP v. McCrory, 831 
F.3d 204, 231 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that in vote denial intent claims “[s]howing 
disproportionate impact . . . suffices to establish one of the circumstances evidencing 
discriminatory intent”). 
 293. See Karlan, supra note 165, at 735 (“Judges, after all, often live in the same 
milieu as other public officials and far away from the plaintiffs who bring racial vote 
dilution lawsuits. If they are compelled to call their acquaintances evil in order to do 
justice, then they may find themselves tempted to shade their judgment in even 
remotely close cases.”); Primus, supra note 136, at 520 (making similar arguments). 
 294. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 36 (finding that “the intent test is unnecessarily 
divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part of individual officials or 
entire communities,” and could exacerbate purposeful discrimination); see also 
Siegel, supra note 226, at 685–86 (observing that the Roberts Court focuses on 
ensuring “interventions designed to heal social division should be implemented in 
ways that do not aggravate social division”). 
 295. See discussion of Reconstruction Amendments at supra notes 7–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 296. Nelson, supra note 63, at 611. 
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Accordingly, opponents of Section 2 have difficulty articulating an 
apolitical, neutral reason for why reducing discriminatory disparate 
impacts on minority groups actually harms non-minority voters; 
they instead resort to an amorphous vote-dilution-by-fraud harm 
that lacks any empirical support and itself reveals racially 
discriminatory assumptions about minority voters’ participation in 
the political process.297 At bottom, successfully applying Section 2 
to ease burdens on voting has no adverse consequences based on 
race and instead offers ancillary benefits for everyone who faces 
barriers to participating in the political process. 
Also, unlike housing and employment, there can be no market-
based reason to limit the franchise. Denials of voting access cannot 
be justified by “business necessity” like in Title VII cases, or the 
need for unencumbered “profit-related decisions” like in the FHA.298 
While opponents argue that race-consciousness in voting laws has 
a chilling effect on creating allegedly justified election 
restrictions,299 the analogy to the potential competing interests 
outlined in Ricci and Inclusive Communities is hollow because any 
urgent interest in profit maximization is off the table and the 
overriding state interest in voting should be maximizing 
participation by all eligible voters.300 A state’s interests in cost-
minimization, administrative convenience, or confronting 
speculative concerns over voter fraud should always be secondary 
to the chief purpose of election administration: enfranchising 
eligible voters.301 Section 2’s results test is in step with this order of 
priority.  
 
 297. See id. (“[T]he individual and collective right to vote can be adversely 
impacted when the franchise is extended impermissibly. Voting power is diluted 
when unlawful votes are cast. With respect to modern vote denial measures such as 
voter ID laws and excessive voter purge practices, however, proof of unlawful voting 
is negligible . . . .”); see also Bognet v. Sec’y of Pa., 980 F.3d 336, 358 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(rejecting that vote-dilution-by-fraud injuries are sufficient to confer standing). 
 298. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 34, at 1608 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 533 (2015)). 
 299. See Clegg, supra note 66, at 39 (arguing that “whenever the government bans 
actions (public or private) that merely have racially disparate impact, . . . actions 
that are perfectly legitimate will be abandoned”). 
 300. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 34, at 1571 (comparing interests related to 
voting and housing). 
 301. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 237 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(summarizing testimony that addressing voter fraud has long been used as the 
proffered rationale for a range of election laws that were nonetheless rejected for 
their discrimination); Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 869 (6th Cir. 2006), 
vacated as moot, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 690 (1973), to support the proposition that potential “[a]dministrative 
convenience” or cost-cutting rationales by election officials are “simply not a 
compelling justification in light of the fundamental nature of the right” at stake).  
2021] Vote Denial & Defense 105 
Finally, finding a Section 2 vote denial violation does not 
require any problematic analysis that separates people into racial 
categories at the expense of other traits.302 While such alleged 
“racial sorting” is a common argument against the vote dilution 
results test, it is not a coherent critique in the vote denial context.303 
This is because vote denial claims do not prompt courts to categorize 
voters in a way that could precipitate racial polarization, do not 
require data showing how minority voters might prefer certain 
candidates in conflict with the preferences of non-minority voters, 
and do not demand proportional representation or any political 
outcomes at all.304 In short, Section 2 vote denial results claims call 
for no race-based assumptions—or in Chief Justice Roberts’ words: 
“divvying us up by race”305—that could aggravate instead of 
improve perceived racial divisions. 
Conclusion 
For voting rights advocates seeking to stem the rise of voter 
suppression, it cannot be ignored that opponents of Section 2 are 
making increasingly explicit claims against the constitutionality of 
the vote denial results test,306 and a conservative majority of the 
Court could adopt any one of these arguments to do serious damage 
to the VRA. Some commentators have suggested that the best way 
to protect Section 2 is by adopting a different test that further limits 
liability and offers a greater platform to the state’s proffered 
justifications.307 But the concerns about Section 2’s constitutionality 
are overstated and should be rejected on their merits.  
The Supreme Court should affirm rather than limit the last best 
VRA mechanism for protecting an equal right to vote. Section 2 is 
 
 302. See Clegg, supra note 66, at 39 (claiming that the results test makes 
jurisdictions adopt “surreptitious—or not so surreptitious—racial quotas . . . so that 
the action is no longer racially disparate in its impact”); Primus, supra note 279, at 
1342 (agreeing it is problematic if Title VII “requires employers and public officials 
to classify the workforce into racial categories and then allocate social goods on the 
basis of that classification”). 
 303. In vote dilution, by contrast, some commentators have argued that Section 2 
results claims seem to require courts to “engage in ad hoc determinations of the 
voting behaviors of minority and non-minority groups” and separate them 
accordingly, which could be misconstrued as presenting an affront to individual 
dignity of voters or adopting racial quotas for minority representation. See Morgan, 
supra note 62, at 109, 113. 
 304. Id. at 116. 
 305. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) 
(Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 306. See supra notes 32, 66–68. 
 307. See supra note 62. 
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appropriately remedial and sufficiently tailored legislation to 
enforce the substantive Reconstruction Amendments’ right of equal 
suffrage in today’s voter suppression environment. And the vote 
denial results test safeguards principles of equality in the political 
process rather than offending them.  
In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson captured the essence of 
these two truths about the VRA when signing the bill into law: 
 
This act flows from a clear and simple wrong. Its only purpose 
is to right that wrong. Millions of Americans are denied the 
right to vote because of their color. This law will ensure them 
the right to vote. The wrong is one which no American, in his 
heart, can justify. The right is one which no American, true to 
our principles, can deny.308 
 
Section 2 of the VRA remains faithful to these principles and the 
results test continues to be an effective, restrained, and 
constitutionally justified tool for addressing the “clear and simple 
wrong”309 of voter suppression. Inequality in the political process is 
not merely an isolated problem or vestige of the past, and Section 2 
is urgently needed to confront modern threats to American 
democracy. 
 
 308. Lyndon B. Johnson, President, U.S., Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the 
Signing of the Voting Rights Act (Aug. 6, 1965), www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
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